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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the first period of the Kyoto Protocol, there has been a growing concern that the burden of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions should not only be borne by developed countries, but developing 
countries as well. South Africa, as the 18th highest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world and highest 
in Africa, has a significant responsibility to reduce its emissions levels. The South African government is 
currently in the process of implementing a carbon tax for its short term response to climate change and 
considering the implementation of a carbon market as a medium to long term response to climate 
change. Both of these market based mechanisms are widely deemed effective in the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions by economists, however are also known to have negative social and economic 
implications upon an economy. This study identifies these implications and attempts to provide 
considerations on how to alleviate the implications through the most appropriate process of revenue 
recycling. 
 
The negative effects of Implementing a carbon tax or carbon market could be severe as and not limited 
to: a significant decline in GDP, a reduction in the standard of living for certain households, a fall in a 
country's exports and even an increase in poverty. South Africa's environmental and development 
policies place a strict precedence on the protection of the poor and the prevention of economic 
hardship induced by such policies. This places significant importance on the prevention of these 
externalities from occurring. A primary means of doing so is through the process of revenue recycling, 
however, certain channels of revenue recycling are by no means helpful, hence the most appropriate 
channel needs to be identified. 
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The study carried out a multiple case study analysis on Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway, to 
determine what effects a carbon tax had on their economies and how these effects were mitigated 
through carbon tax revenue recycling. An additional analysis of the EU ETS was carried out to determine 
how the EU ETS was implemented and the controversies and concerns that arose during its 
implementation. The findings of this analysis were then compared to a number of South African 
economist’s case studies, and the most appropriate method of revenue recycling identified and possible 
solutions to the EU ETS controversies found.  
 
The study concludes that a food subsidy has the potential to provide positive effects on welfare 
employment and GDP; therefore could be considered to be the most appropriate method of revenue 
recycling. However, these effects are limited to be experienced only at low levels of a carbon tax, hence, 
short term in nature. The study therefore provides a further consideration that the use of multiple 
channels for revenue recycling needs to be explored that could provide stable longer term effects. In 
addition, in the implementation of a carbon market, the study concludes that government should 
consider using an auction approach in the initial allocation phase of an ETS and the use of a centralized 
registry for monitoring and controlling of information and transactions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In August 1997, SA ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in March 2002 (Scholtz and De Villiers 2011: 23). This provided South 
African industries with an opportunity to reduce their carbon emissions by contributing to the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and, through Carbon Emissions Reduction (CER) trading with 
more developed nations, provide cleaner technology and extra income as benefits to South Africa 
(Tucker and Gore 2008:1). The Kyoto Protocol places a legal constraint on countries to reduce their 
emissions to their 1990 levels (Winkler, Marquard and Jooste, 2010: 136; Spash, 2009: 2; De Perthuis, 
2007: 13). Although this constraint is placed only on developed countries that have acceded to the 
Kyoto Protocol, as the country with the highest carbon emissions in Africa, South Africa has a 
responsibility to reduce its carbon emissions, which requires an effective mitigation strategy (Linacre, 
Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2011: 36). 
Government announced in the 2010 Budget Review its intention to investigate the feasibility of a 
comprehensive carbon pricing regime for South Africa with a focus on carbon taxes (National Treasury 
2010: 12). However, after considering public responses to the 2010 discussion paper for public comment 
released by the national treasury, government submitted the White Paper on National Climate Change 
Response, which revises governments approach to make use of carbon taxation in the immediate future 
(potentially by 2013) and implementing a carbon market as a medium to long term approach, as part of 
governments mitigation strategy (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) 2011: 40 -
141). The use of both a Pigouvian tax and an emissions trading system (ETS) can be effective in reducing 
emissions, however, both have potential negative and positive economic and social impacts that need to 
be considered before being implemented. 
Chameides and Oppenheimer (2007: 1670) explain the benefits of an ETS as; lowering deforestation, 
preserving irreplaceable ecosystems and providing income to developing economies. Furthermore, an 
ETS assures that environmental goals are achieved by a certain date through the caps it places on 
industries (Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009: 10). ETS’s are also supported by the Kyoto Protocol as a primary 
means of reducing carbon emissions and have been implemented by a number of annex 1 (developed) 
countries (O’Donnell, 2012:5). This implies that an ETS could be a useful policy which would help 
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developing countries such as South Africa, to become more proactively engaged in CER trading over a 
long term basis, effectively helping limit its emissions if implemented (Wen-Cen, 2011: 116-118). On a 
similar note, an early carbon tax, although not being capable of placing a cap on emitters’ carbon 
emissions, could still supplement mitigation by providing incentives to reduce emissions through tax 
penalties (Andrew, Kaidonis and Andrew, 2010: 613; Nauclér and Enkvist 2009: 17; Sathre and 
Gustavsson, 2007: 488). 
Delbosc and De Perthuis (2009: 20-25) provide a framework on four pillars for implementing an ETS, 
namely: 1) the allocation process; 2) establishing a reliable measure and control of emissions; 3) 
implementing registries and market transparency for the trading and control of emissions; and lastly, 4) 
introducing flexibility to help reach capped targets. Furthermore, Flachsland, Edenhofer, Jakob and 
Steckel (2008) provide insight into developing an international carbon trading market, in particular, 
linking carbon markets such as New Zealand’s, Australia’s and the United States of America’s carbon 
trading schemes and other developing ETS to the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).  
Gilbertson and Reyes (2009: 7), on the other hand, highlighted some of the negative impacts that an ETS 
has on economies. Gilbertson and Reyes (2009: 7) identified carbon trading as a capitalist ploy to make 
more money through charging polluters to clean up their own mess. The House of Lords (2006: 102), in 
their paper presented in London, explained how an ETS may inappropriately set a cap on emissions at a 
volume to low or too high, rendering the cap ineffective (House of Lords 2006: 102).  
The consensus made by most economists regarding the use of  market based mechanisms (usually 
carbon taxation or an ETS) to mitigate climate change, is that they are indeed effective in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, however, are also considered to be regressive by impacting low income 
households and economies negatively. Given this, it is unclear as to how a carbon tax or an ETS would 
impact upon South Africa both economically and socially and therefore, how these market based 
mechanisms should be implemented. By exploring how these policies have been implemented in other 
countries, along with their successes and failures, a better representation can be created of the most 
suitable direction for South Africa to proceed and implement these policies in such a way as to minimize 
their regressive tendencies.  
Considering South Africa’s current economic hardships, specifically its high levels of inequality and 
poverty, the negative implications of a carbon tax could be detrimental to low income households and 
increase income inequality levels, while an ETS could possibly be ineffective and fail if not implemented 
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correctly. However, if revenues from a carbon tax and ETS are recycled correctly in their 
implementation, these negative implications may be avoided or at the least, reduced. Hence further 
research is required on the topic. 
1.1 Goals of the Research 
The main objective of this thesis is to recommend an appropriate method of recycling carbon tax and 
ETS revenues, in such a way as to minimize externalities that may arise in implementing these market 
based instruments. 
1.2 Procedures and Techniques 
The primary objective of this thesis is to be achieved through the form of a qualitative study. The study 
will identify the advantages and disadvantages of both an ETS and a carbon tax policy in their 
effectiveness of mitigating carbon emissions and their social implications of implementing them.  
A comparative analysis will be conducted, using multiple case studies, to determine the welfare impacts 
of implementing a carbon tax in four different countries, namely: Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and 
Mexico. The analysis will be carried out through a Hermeneutic tradition. Each case study will be 
subjected to an interpretive understanding of the redistribution effects caused by a carbon tax, and how 
in each case this was overcome through revenue recycling. 
Similarly, the difficulties experienced by the EU ETS during the EU ETS’s three phased implementation 
will be looked at through the same method.  
This qualitative data from the above case studies will then be applied within a South African context to 
create considerations in implementing a carbon tax and an ETS in South Africa. Particularly focussing on 
how a carbon tax and ETS revenues may be recycled in SA and in such a way as to minimize the potential 
negative implications that a carbon tax or ETS may cause.  
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The study is comprised of six chapters, beginning with this introduction as the first. The second chapter 
presents a background into the understanding and mitigation of climate change, including a discussion 
of the merits and demerits of market based mechanisms in mitigating climate change. The third chapter 
explains South Africa's socioeconomic and emissions profile in brief. This chapter also includes a brief 
description of South Africa's current and past environmental policies, including the White Paper on 
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National Climate Change Response (2011), that aims to help to mitigate climate change in South 
Africa.  
 
Chapter four provides a multiple case study scenario of the implementation of carbon taxes in New 
Zealand, Mexico, Ireland and Norway. Specifically how each country was impacted upon by the tax and 
how these regressive impacts were mitigated though different channels of revenue recycling. The 
chapter continues to discuss the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), how it was implemented, 
the problems the European Union incurred in implementing it and how these problems were then 
resolved. This chapter carries over into chapter five through the application of the case studies in a 
South African context. The issues and concerns raised by each country in their implementation of a 
carbon tax are compared to the potential impacts that they may have on South Africa economically and 
socially. This is addressed through the potential methods of revenue recycling identified in chapter four. 
Each channel that revenues are recycled through, impacts upon South Africa both economically and 
socially in a unique fashion. These impacts are discussed in an attempt to isolate the channel or 
channels that most effectively reduces the regressive nature of a carbon tax or ETS and potentially 
provides positive dividends (positive externalities). Chapter five also provides further considerations for 
implementing an ETS as a medium to long term solution for the mitigation of climate change, specifically 
regarding the initial allocation of allowances and registries for the transactions of carbon credits. 
 
The summary and conclusions of the study are presented in chapter six. Chapter six summarises the 
main findings of chapters two, three, four and five and concludes with considerations for the 
implementation of a carbon tax or an ETS in the mitigation of climate change in South Africa. 
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Chapter 2 
Understanding and Mitigating Climate 
Change 
 
2.1 Defining and Understanding Climate Change 
Hegerlet al (2007:667) explains climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and 
that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer”. There exists an undisputed fact that 
the earth’s climate is warming up. “Present day global climate models predict a warming of 1.5 degrees 
to 4.5 degrees Celsius for a C02 doubling within the next century. In contrast, the earth's temperature 
has risen only 0.5-0.7 degrees Celsius in the last century, and probably has not varied more than 1-2 
degrees Celsius in the last ten thousand years, or 6-7 degrees Celsius in the last million years” (Arrenhius 
and Waltz 1990:2). Staudt et al, (2008:3) states the following: “temperatures have already risen 1.4°F 
since the start of the 20th century—with much of this warming occurring in just the last 30 years—and 
temperatures will likely rise at least another 2°F, and possibly more than 11°F, over the next 100 years”. 
Hence, it is clear to see the world is indeed experiencing a period of climate change. 
Physical changes to the earth’s systems are observable and for this reason, make it easy for scientists to 
agree on the reason for the cause of these changes, i.e. global warming causing climate change. 
However, there has been an ongoing dispute with regards to the causes of global warming. Delbosc and 
De Perthuis, (2009: 9) stated that it is the leading role of human emissions causing global warming. 
Rosenzweig et al (2007: 83) identified that “Most of the observed increases in globally averaged 
temperatures since the mid-20th century are very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations”. These two views highlight the actions of human activities as the 
primary cause of global warming and hence climate change. Actions such as fossil fuel burning and 
deforestation lead to a build up of green house gas (GHG) emissions and thus, a warming of the earth’s 
atmosphere. This implies that, in order for global warming to be reduced and the effects of climate 
change to be mitigated, there has to be a reduction in GHG emissions. 
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Hansen et al (2000: 1) share a different view to that of Delbosc and De Perthuis (2009). Hansen et al 
(2000:1) argued that global warming is not a result of a CO2 build up, but rather an increase in the 
concentration of non CO2 greenhouse gasses. Examples used by Hansen et al (2000: 1) are: 
chlorofluorocarbons, CH4, and N2O. The crux of Hansen et al (2000) argument lies in the fact that if 
sources of CH4 and O3 were reduced in the future, climate change could be reduced to an acceleration 
rate of zero within the next fifty years. Thus, the conflicting argument lies around what the current 
causes of global warming are, whether they are anthropogenic in nature or a natural phenomenon. 
Figure 2.1 helps depict the differences between natural warming and amplified warming, i.e. 
atmospheric warming induced by human activities: 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Natural and Amplified Warming  
(Staudtet al, 2008:3) 
 
Between Kannberg et al, (2009: 7) and Delbosc and De Perthuis (2009: 9), an approximation of between 
60% - 65% of global anthropogenic GHG comes from energy-related activities. The remaining 30%-35% 
are acclaimed to come primarily from agricultural and land-use practices.  
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Hansen et al (2000: 9877) are able to separate these GHG emissions into three large distinctive 
categories, namely:  methane (CH4), chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s) and carbon dioxide (CO2). CH4 is 
produced naturally through “microbial decay of organic matter under anaerobic conditions in wetlands” 
(Hansen et al 2000: 9877). However, it is also identified as being produced artificially through human 
activities i.e. “including: rice cultivation, domestic ruminants, bacterial decay in landfills and sewage, 
leakage during the mining of fossil fuels, leakage from natural gas pipelines, and biomass burning” 
(Hansen et al 2000: 9877). The anthropogenic GHG emissions of CH4 are said to be twice as large as the 
natural emissions of CH4, but if global warming persists, it will cause these natural wetlands to expand 
(Hansen et al 2000: 9877).  CFC’s are mainly produced through the use of aerosols, “detrimental effects 
of aerosols, include acid rain and health impacts and will eventually limit the permissible atmospheric 
aerosol amount and thus expose latent greenhouse warming” (Hansen et al 2000: 9878).  However, 
Hansen et al (2000: 9877) explain that since the Montreal Protocol, the growth rate of the two principal 
CFCs is estimated to be near zero and may be the largest source of uncertainty about future climate 
change. This simply means that more knowledge and research is required on aerosol GHG emissions.  
Of the three categories of GHG emissions, C02 is identified to be the largest and most concerning GHG. 
“Since the onset of the industrial revolution around 1850, the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) has 
increased by 31%” (Rattan L 2007: 815). Hegerl et al (2007: 2) agrees with this by stating that “the 
annual carbon dioxide concentration growth-rate was larger during the last 10 years (1995 – 2005 
average: 1.9 ppm per year), than it has been since the beginning of continuous direct atmospheric 
measurements (1960 – 2005 average: 1.4 ppm per year). Kannberg et al, (2009: 7), claims that “globally, 
89 percent of primary energy consumed comes from fossil fuels, (85 percent in the U.S.)”. Kannberg et 
al (2009: 7) explained that “carbon dioxide emissions have an estimated atmospheric half-life of 27 
years, which means almost one-third of today’s emissions will remain in the atmosphere for 100 years”. 
This means that the more anthropogenic C02 emissions produced, the warmer the atmosphere and 
ocean will become over longer periods, i.e. over the next 100 years. The following diagram by Stern, 
(2006:4) helps depict the different volumes of GHG and their contributions to global warming and hence 
climate change. 
14 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Energy Emission 
Stern (2006:4) 
Staudt et al (2008: 6) explained that the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere was 
precisely in equilibrium with the quantities absorbed by plant life before the industrial revolution. 
However, anthropogenic actions, such as the burning of fossil fuels have caused a disruption in this 
balance that has made a build of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This build up of CO2 has resulted in 
the amplification of the natural greenhouse effect and lead to a number of physical and economic 
consequences that will be addressed below. 
2.1.1 Physical Impacts and Effects of Climate Change 
Rosenzweig et al (2007: 83) and the Pew Centre of Global Climate Change Report (2007:3): provide the 
following observable changes with regards to the extent of climate change on the earth’s physical 
systems:  
Changes in the global and ocean temperatures; a rise in global sea level, a decline in the northern 
hemispheres snow cover and increase in its snow melt and runoff; a decline in lake and river duration of 
ice cover; and lastly a decline in northern hemisphere mountain glacier and snow cover. 
2.1.2 Economic Impacts and Effects of Climate Change 
These physical impacts have deeper and more devastating possible impacts on various countries 
populations. “Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around the world – access 
to water, food, health, and use of land and the environment” (Stern 2006:56). The bases on which many 
of these economic problems arise are often mediated by water. Severe impacts such as droughts and 
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floods may have drastic impacts upon peoples’ lives and livelihoods. The following table provided by 
Stern, (2006:56)   helps to explain a number of these concerns: 
 
Table2.1: Economic Impacts of Climate Change 
Melting 
glaciers 
Will increase flood risk during the wet season and strongly reduce dry-season water 
supplies to one-sixth of the world’s population, predominantly in the Indian sub-
continent, parts of China, and the Andes in South America. 
Declining 
crop yields 
Especially in Africa, are likely to leave hundreds of millions without the ability to 
produce or purchase sufficient food - particularly if the carbon fertilisation effect is 
weaker than previously thought, as some recent studies suggest. At mid to high 
latitudes, crop yields may increase for moderate temperature rises (2 – 3°C), but then 
decline with greater amounts of warming. 
Ocean 
acidification 
A direct result of rising carbon dioxide levels will have major effects on marine 
ecosystems, with possible adverse consequences on fish stocks. 
Rising sea 
levels 
Will result in tens to hundreds of millions more people flooded each year with a 
warming of 3 or 4°C. There will be serious risks and increasing pressures for coastal 
protection in South East Asia (Bangladesh and Vietnam), small islands in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, and large coastal cities, such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Mumbai, Calcutta, Karachi, Buenos Aires, St Petersburg, New York, Miami and 
London.  
Climate 
change 
Will lead to increased worldwide deaths from malnutrition and heat stress. Vector-
borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever could become more widespread if 
effective control measures are not in place. In higher latitudes, cold-related deaths 
will decrease. By the middle of the century, 200 million more people may become 
permanently displaced due to rising sea levels, heavier floods, and more intense 
droughts, according to one estimate. 
Source:  Stern, (2006:56) 
Rosenzweig et al (2007: 83) explained that the economic impacts of climate change will vary from 
country to country, from one climate region to the next. However, not all of these impacts will have 
negative effects. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002: 109) stated that these economic impacts may be 
uncertain and difficult to interpret in terms of specific temperature increases and when or how these 
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temperature changes may affect each region. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002: 109 – 112) continued to 
discuss how climatologists have difficulty in accurately measuring and predicting the effects of certain 
elements in the atmosphere and how they affect global temperature change.  
 
These uncertainties mean that climatologists cannot accurately predict the economic impacts and costs 
that climate change will have globally. This means that proposed impacts such as the mentioned by 
Stern (2006: 56) may not be as severe as initially proposed, and would have different effects in each 
region of the globe. Tol (2009: 6) provides a table of fourteen studies (table 2.2), that displays estimates 
of the welfare loss due to climate change”. The table helps depict how different global regions will be 
affected by climate change, both positively and negatively given different scenarios of global warming, 
and which regions would be worst off or best off in each given scenario. Tol (2006: 9) states three 
important findings with regards to these studies:  
1) There is an understanding that an increase in the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions 
would only affect the current global economy by a few percentage points. 
2)  Economic gains due to climate change are substantially smaller compared to the losses that 
would be experienced. 
3) Low income countries generally impact climate change greater than high income countries that 
have a higher greenhouse gas emission per person. 
 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002: 113) agree with Tol’s (2006: 9) third finding, by stating that developing 
countries are more at risk to the adverse effects of climate change. Whereas developed countries would 
tend to experience more of a positive impact. 
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Table 2.2:  Welfare Impacts of Climate Change on GDP in Different Regions 
Study Warming 
 
Impact Worst-off region Best-off region 
 (˚C) 
 
(%GDP) 
 
(%GDP) 
 
(Name) 
 
(%GDP) 
 
(Name) 
 
(Nordhaus, 
William D. 
1994) 
3.0 -1.3 -4.7    
(Nordhaus 
1994) 
3.0 -4.8 
(-30.0 to 0.0) 
    
(Fankhauser, 
Samuel 1995) 
 
2.5 
 
-1.4 
 
-4.7 
 
China 
 
-0.7 
 
Eastern 
Europe and 
the former 
Soviet Union 
(Tol 1995) 
 
2.5 
 
-1.9 
 
-8.7 
 
Africa 
 
-0.3 
 
Eastern 
Europe and 
the former 
Soviet Union 
(Nordhaus 
and Yang 
1996) 
2.5 
 
-1.7 
 
-2.1 
 
Developing 
countries 
0.9 
 
Former 
Soviet Union 
(Plamberk 
and Hope 
1996) 
2.5 
 
-2.5 
(-0.5 to –
11.4) 
-8.6 
(-0.6 to -39.5) 
Asia (w/o 
China) 
 
0.0 
(-0.2 to 1.5) 
Eastern 
Europe and 
the former 
Soviet Union 
(Mendelsohn 
et al. 2000a) 
 
2.5 
 
0.0 
0.1 
-3.6 
-0.5 
Africa 
 
4.0 
1.7 
Eastern 
Europe and 
the former 
Soviet Union 
(Nordhaus, 
William D. 
and Boyer, 
Joseph G. 
2000) 
2.5 
 
-1.5 
 
-3.9 
 
Africa 
 
0.7 
 
Russia 
 
(Tol 2002a) 
 
1.0 
 
2.3 
(1.0) 
-4.1 
(2.2) 
Africa 
 
3.7 
(2.2) 
Western 
Europe 
(Maddison 
2003) 
2.5 -0.1 -14.6 South 
America 
2.5 Western 
Europe 
(Rehdanz 
and 
Maddison 
2005) 
1.0 
 
-0.4 
 
-23.5 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
12.9 
 
South Asia 
 
(Hope 2006) 
 
2.5 
 
0.9 
(-0.2 to 2.7) 
-2.6 
(-0.4 to 10.0) 
Asia (w/o 
China) 
 
0.3 
(-2.5 to 0.5) 
Eastern 
Europe and 
the former 
Soviet Union 
(Nordhaus 
2006) 
2.5 
 
-0.9 
(0.1) 
    
(Tol 2009:6, 8) 
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The significance of these findings is the effects that they have on policy decisions for abatement. The 
question to the degree of abatement rests on the undisputed fact that climate change is happening, but 
to what extent do countries need to mitigate and given the fact that the costs of abatement now will be 
very high, which countries should bear these costs? Should the developed or developing countries bear 
abatement costs? Overall, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) concluded that these 
impacts may only be either a small increase or decrease in the world’s GDP. Hence, are a few percent 
changes worthwhile causes to implement a complex abatement strategy, or is the world better off 
suffering the effects of climate change. Stern (2007) argues that unless greenhouse gasses are cut today, 
the world’s economic growth and well-being may suffer severely in the future (up to 5% of global Gross 
Domestic Product). Whereas economist Mendelsohn (2009:8) argued that climate change may be a 
serious problem and require attention; however, society’s current actions and decisions are highly 
unlikely to lead to any cataclysmic consequences. 
 
Watkins (2008:1) placed the true costs of climate change into context through his proclamation that 
although climate change may only cost the world a few basis points in terms of GDP, however, to some 
of the world’s poorest people, the consequences could be catastrophic. In a paper presented to the 
House of Lords (2006:7), an alternative view was taken, it was explained that although the costs and 
penalties of the abatement of climate change should be borne now as opposed to being left to future 
generations, there are considerable time lags and opportunity costs that would be forgone in not 
addressing other significant current issues such as global poverty, hunger, war and HIV now. Therefore, 
there exists a debate on whether to make use of all available resources now to install preventative 
measures on climate change, or to make use of resources on more pressing matters, such as global 
poverty mentioned above. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002; 116) sum up this argument in their 
explanation that the current knowledge on climate change is sufficient to validate the abatement of 
climate change. However, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002; 116) do go on to state that not enough is 
known to justify drastic CO2 emission cuts and that there still exists a level of uncertainty that only 
warrants a prudent but modest approach to mitigation. 
2.2 Abatement of Climate Change 
Kannberg et al, (2009:4), provides two alternatives for abatement. First is the idea of adaptation to 
climate change, described as the alteration of one’s lifestyle to reduce their impact on climate change. 
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Mendelsohn (2000: 583) explained that every country’s government in the world should seek to 
implement strict adaptation policies, regardless of whether or not their government implements an 
abatement policy. Kannberg et al (2009:4-5) provide the following examples of adaptation measures 
including: “promoting efficient use of water resources; developing low-cost technologies for desalinating 
seawater; improving health care and pest control; developing and using drought-resistant crops; and 
constructing disaster-resistant buildings and infrastructures”. 
 
Although adaptation seems a suitable means of abatement, Kannberg et al (2009:5) explained that 
although adaptation is effective and can be implemented globally and encourage global cooperation, it 
only really needs to be implemented by those that are in harm’s way. Hence countries that are not 
affected negatively by climate change may have little motivation or incentive to implement adaptation 
policies. Furthermore, Mendelsohn (2000: 585) argues two important points with regards to adaptation. 
The first is that in order for adaptation to work, it must be effective. This implies that the benefit of 
adaptation must be greater than the cost. The second point is the need to distinguish between private 
and public adaptations. Private adaptations are done out of self-interest and hence are always efficient. 
However, public adaptations incur political pressures which may encourage governments to engage in 
inefficient adaptation behaviours.  
 
Kannberg et al’s (2009:4) second abatement alternative is the mitigation of climate change through the 
reduction of GHG concentrations. Kannberg et al (2009: 4-16) provided a variety of methods and ideas 
of how to reduce GHG emissions, some of which are: 
1) Reducing CO2 emissions for electricity – more specifically by substituting to fuels that have a 
lower CO2 emission per unit of electricity produced; by efficiency improvement of the 
production and end use of electricity and through carbon sequestration (capturing and 
permanently storing carbon emissions). 
2) Focussing and realizing the potential of renewable electric power- Specifically Hydropower 
(particularly rivers, reservoirs, ocean, wave and tidal hydrokinetic energy usage); Biomass 
(mainly the firing of post-consumer residues of the forest industry – pulp and paper industries); 
Wind power (which is today’s fastest growing renewable energy source); Solar Power (parabolic 
troughs, dish engines systems, and heliostat-based power towers); Photovoltaic’s (Photovoltaic 
(PV) modules can be used for utility-scale electricity generation) and lastly Geothermal Power 
(practical only where underground steam or water exists at temperatures greater than 100°C). 
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3) Increasing the use of Nuclear Power – It is a fact that nuclear energy is a low emissions and low 
climate impact technology, however, there is high controversy regarding waste disposal and the 
safe guarding against weapons proliferation. Regardless of these political issues, nuclear energy 
is still regarded as one of the best sources for clean and efficient energy.  
 
Stern (2006:12- 114) is of the same opinion as Kannberg et al (2009) regarding GHG reduction methods. 
Stern (2006: 12), challenges that GHG need to be reduced by 25%, and highlights four ways in which to 
do so, which are very similar to the Kannberg et al (2009) methods. Notably:  
1) Reducing demand for emissions-intensive goods and services. 
2) Increased efficiency, which can save both money and emissions  
3) Action on non-energy emissions, such as avoiding deforestation 
4) Switching to lower-carbon technologies for power, heat and transport. Estimating the costs of 
these changes can be done in two ways. One is to look at the resource costs of measures, 
including the introduction of low-carbon technologies and changes in land use, compared with 
the costs of the business as usual (BAU) alternative. This provides an upper bound on costs, as it 
does not take account of opportunities to respond involving reductions in demand for high-
carbon goods and services. 
 
Watkins (2008:5) shared a different approach regarding the abatement of GHG emissions, which is 
primarily that developed countries have to take the lead. Developed countries have polluted and 
damaged the earth’s atmosphere on a greater scale and for a longer period than all developing 
countries’ contributions put together. Thus, it could be said that developed countries should take 
responsibility and bear the burden and costs for the mitigation of climate change. Furthermore, 
developed countries have the financial resources and technological capabilities to commence with an 
early effort to minimize their CO2 emissions. 
 
Pricing carbon through a carbon tax or cap and trade system are common methods involved in a 
government market based approach to reducing GHG emissions. Stern (2006: 18) proposed three 
essential elements in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. The elements were necessary for an 
effective mitigation policy that could be used to combat climate change, namely a carbon price, a 
technology policy, and the removal of barriers to behavioural change. This implies that governments 
need to create an effective policy that not only prices carbon, but encourages the development of low 
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carbon emission technology and encourages behavioural change (particularly carbon reducing lifestyle 
changes) in order to overcome market imperfections (global warming). Nauclér and Enkvist (2009: 17) 
encouraged a similar policy through the establishment of long-term incentives that encourage power 
producers and industrial companies to develop and deploy greenhouse gas efficient technologies, e.g., 
in the form of a CO2 price or a CO2 tax. 
 
Overcoming market imperfections (as mentioned above) implies that global warming and climate 
change is a result of market failure. This market failure is the result of pollution created by 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Since the industrial revolution, developed countries, and 
more recently, developing countries have been polluting the atmosphere by increasing their greenhouse 
gas emissions (particularly through burning coal and oil), which has had a negative impact on each and 
every person in the world (Watkins 2008:7). From the above, it is conceivable that the derived solution 
to this negative externality, proposed by Stern (2006), Watkins (2008) and Nauclér and Enkvist (2009), is 
to employ a policy/regulation, which reduces emissions and encourages emission reducing technology 
development. Two policies which fulfil these criteria and have been used in practice for decades now are 
the Pigouvian carbon taxation and the carbon cap and trade systems.  
2.2.1 Pigouvian Carbon Taxation 
To understand the concept of a Pigouvian tax, public goods and externalities have to be addressed first. 
Perman, McGilvray and Common (2003:126) describe a public good as one that is non excludable 
(people cannot be prevented from consuming the good), and non rivalrous (one person consuming the 
good is not done at the expense of another person’s ability to consume the good). Examples of public 
goods are: air, sunlight and defence services provided by government. Perman et al (2003: 134) 
described an externality as occurring when the production or consumption of a person or industry, 
otherwise known as an “agent”, directly or indirectly affects the utility or income/profits of another 
agent (creates a negative or positive externality), and when no recompense is made to the affected 
agent by the “generating agent”. From the above mentioned, it should be clear now that the generation 
of air pollution by developed countries since the industrial revolution and more recent developing 
countries are in fact negative externalities. The pollution generated by these countries affects the 
earth’s atmosphere (a public good) and hence is a source of market failure, requiring compensation to 
all afflicted parties.  
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Carlton and Loury (1980: 559) explained that the most common market based mechanism for the 
abatement of carbon emission is through the imposition of a Pigouvian tax, (a per unit tax) on 
externality produced activities.   Simply put, a Pigouvian tax places an additional cost on the externality 
generating activity, with the intention of reducing the marginal damage (MD) (damage incurred per unit 
of output generated), thereby increasing marginal benefit (MB) (benefit incurred per unit of output 
generated). The intention of a carbon tax is to alter consumer behaviour, through encouraging 
consumers to reduce their emissions. This is promoted through the elevation of a carbon tax. The higher 
a carbon tax is raised, the more pressure is placed on consumers and producers to alter their carbon 
emission behaviours (Chameides and Oppenheimer 2007:1670). Baumol and Oates (1971: 42) share a 
similar statement, that a Pigouvian tax should be implemented at a level where the tax on an activity is 
equal to the marginal social damages that the activity generates. The implication here is that the tax 
would be at a level high enough to not only cover the external damages created by the “polluting 
activity”, but to also discourage future damages. Perman et al (2003: 218) and Oates (1990: 290) 
explained that the use of carbon taxes is effective in reducing emissions to an efficient level and reduces 
externalities produced by the emissions. Perman et al (2003: 217) illustrated the concept of MB and MC 
and how efficiency may be achieved through the implementation of a Pigouvian tax in figure 2.3 below. 
 
At a position below the equilibrium (blue dot), MB>MC, which implies that society is benefitting 
positively and is being compensated over and above the damages that the emission polluting activities 
are causing; whereas a position above the equilibrium results in MC>MB, implying that society is 
experiencing a harmful negative externality and is not being compensated enough for it. 
 
Perman et al (2003: 217) go on to introduce a carbon “emissions” tax into this scenario and explained its 
effectiveness through a typical example. Consider a polluting firm that faces an increasing marginal 
abatement cost curve. Left unregulated, it will choose to abate zero units of emissions and avoid the 
abatement costs represented by the area underneath the marginal abatement cost curve: C + D + F + G. 
Suppose a benefit-cost analysis has determined that optimal abatement occurs at the blue dot where 
the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves intersect. The resulting level of emissions is e*. To achieve 
this level of abatement, an emissions tax must be set where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, 
represented by the horizontal "tax" line. The polluting firm will find that it is cheaper to abate carbon 
emissions as long as the marginal abatement cost is lower than the tax. Since the tax (B + C) is greater 
than the marginal abatement cost (C) to the left of e* the firm will choose to abate. To the right of e* 
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the marginal abatement cost (D + F + G) is greater than the tax (D + F) so the firm will choose to pay the 
tax and generate emissions = e' - e*.  
 
 
Figure 2.3:  An Emissions Tax to Mitigate Carbon Pollution 
(Perman et al 2003: 217) 
 
Even though a carbon tax would be able to internalize the externality produced by a polluting industry, 
there are a number of externalities that may subsequently arise once a carbon tax is implemented. For 
instance, a tax on carbon dioxide emissions would result in the coal industry increasing the price of coal 
and passing on the burden of the tax to its end consumer. This in turn would increase energy prices, 
which would impact negatively upon poor households.  Alton, Hartley and Thurlow (2012: 1) explain that 
there are a number of economic and social implications that a carbon tax creates. Alton et al (2012: 1) 
identify the effects on import/export competitiveness, the impact of increasing energy prices on poorer 
households and the impact on jobs and wages.  However, Alton et al (2012: 2-10) continue to state that 
a carbon tax also provides direct revenues to government, which in turn may be recycled and used to 
reduce or eliminate these negative effects. There even exists the possibility of incurring a double 
dividend (a possible dual benefit incurred to an economy), by not only mitigating emissions but 
improving GDP through revenue recycling. This is addressed in more detail in chapter 4.   
Besides the negative implications and issues of revenue recycling of a carbon tax, there is also a debate 
as to whether a carbon tax is effective as a possible market based instrument for reducing GHG 
emissions. This is discussed below. 
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2.2.2 The Merits and Demerits of Carbon Taxation 
When emissions from one country adversely affect the environment of other countries, it would be first 
best from a cosmopolitan point of view for the polluting country to impose an internationally optimal 
Pigouvian tax on its emissions, a tax equal to marginal damage in all countries together (Kohn 1991: 
337). Essentially it allows for countries to be accountable for their emissions. Countries that are 
knowingly polluting their own and other countries climates may be willing to implement a carbon tax, 
aimed at reducing their own emissions and providing revenues to offset the externalities they have 
imposed on other countries (Kohn 1991: 338). Hence, developed countries have the opportunity to 
collectively be accountable for the injustices they have imposed towards global warming through 
implementing carbon taxes upon themselves (Kohn 1991: 338).  
Pielke (2009) explained how using a carbon tax is effective in putting a price on carbon. Initially the tax 
level may not be one hundred percent accurate and, in turn, under or over price the cost of carbon 
emissions. However, Pielke (2009) stated that putting a price on carbon at any level is a good starting 
point in reducing emissions. However, McKibbin and Wilcoxe (2002:117) warn against the use of carbon 
taxation in certain scenarios. Where Pielke (2009) is eager to set a tax at any level, McKibbin and 
Wilcoxe (2002: 117) caution that a tax set where the marginal benefits and marginal costs associated 
with the tax are uncertain may result in an adverse outcome. McKibbin and Wilcoxe (2002: 117) used a 
typical example of where a certain pollutant is only dangerous at very high levels of emission. At low 
levels of emissions, the pollutant is harmless and reducing the emissions can be done with constant 
returns to scale. McKibbin and Wilcoxe (2002: 117) explained this scenario as having a steep marginal 
benefit curve and a flat marginal cost curve. Given the scenario, a tax set below the cost of abatement 
would result in firms paying the tax and not reducing emissions. On the other hand, a tax set above the 
cost of abatement, would result in all firms completely cleaning up the pollutant and emissions 
completely stopping, which is not helpful as low emissions were considered harmless.  
Sachs (2009) stated that a carbon tax has a significant advantage in being able to be levied upstream. 
This implies that a carbon tax could be imposed directly to the source of a polluting agent. Taxation on 
coal mines, oil refineries, natural gas deposits and other large emission industries can be far more 
effective and economically efficient than taxing an entire economy. However, being able to tax the 
entire economy on emissions is also another advantage of taxation. Sachs (2009) identified that a 
carbon tax can uniquely cover over an entire economy, from automobiles to household usage, and can 
be put in place to adapt the behaviour of these product usages.  
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Sachs (2009) built on this argument through that a carbon tax has the ability to raise transparent and 
calculable revenues, which can then be used for the acquisition of cleaner, more sustainable technology 
and the research and development of similar future technologies. Krupp, (2009) disagreed with the idea 
of a carbon tax as a means of abatement by stating that the disadvantage of a carbon tax is its inability 
to place a legal limit on the amount of emissions that industries can produce. As mentioned earlier by 
McKibbin and Wilcoxe (2002: 117), if a tax is set at a level where abatement costs are higher than taxes, 
industries will continue to increase their emissions and pay the tax, rather than actually try reduce their 
amount of carbon emissions. Stavins (2009) and Andrew, Kaidonis and Andrew (2010: 617) agreed with 
Krupp’s, (2009) statement that a tax does not provide a definite attainment of a reduction in emissions; 
however Stavins (2009) and Andrew, Kaidonis and Andrew (2010: 617) additionally mentioned that a 
carbon tax provides superior assurance regarding implementation costs. Simply explained, a carbon tax 
can easily be applied to an already existing tax system in. All that is required is an amendment to current 
tax policy within the country. Andrew, Kaidonis and Andrew (2010: 617) continued to state that 
revenues from a carbon tax could also be used to remove or reduce existing taxes or to compensate low 
and middle income households which may be more severely affected by the tax. 
 
Stavins (2009) also raised the issue of political pressures surrounding the introductions of a carbon tax. 
Governments may choose to provide certain tax exemptions to firms for their own personal gain, or due 
to political pressures in a voting campaign. These exemptions of sectors and firms would reduce the 
environmental effectiveness of a tax. Any government official that introduces a carbon tax would be 
subject to severe political pressures from interest groups that are most affected by the tax. From a 
political stand point a carbon tax is therefore very intimidating and impractical for politicians.  
 
Komanoff (2009) provided a different opinion, that a carbon tax is an extremely effective tool in the 
abatement of carbon emissions. Komanoff (2009) explained how it is important that the world acquires 
new technologies that will help in the elimination of carbon production technologies and the production 
of clean sustainable technology in place. Essentially, Komanof (2009) raised four important reasons why 
a carbon tax is an ideal tool for reducing carbon emissions, namely: carbon taxes create price certainty; 
there is simplicity and immediacy in implementing a carbon tax; the possibility of international 
harmonization through the use of mechanisms such as border taxes and lastly, there is pure 
transparency in a carbon tax through legislation and in implementation. 
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Andrew, Kaidonis and Andrew (2010: 616) expressed a similar view that a carbon tax is transparent, 
which makes it difficult to avoid or evade. Furthermore, transparency ensures that all revenues 
generated by the carbon tax would have to be accounted for by government and made visible to the 
public. Fischhoff (2009) shares the same view of a carbon tax mainly that the transparency of a carbon 
tax allows the setting of clear defined goals which are made achievable through the accountability 
strained upon government. 
An alternative market based instrument, which is widely supported as effective and also encourages 
international involvement in climate change mitigation, is through the establishment of a carbon 
market, known as an emission trading system or a cap and trade system. 
2.2.3 A Cap and Trade System 
“The first environmental permit markets were implemented during the 90s in the US to combat acid rain 
from SO2 emissions” (Delbosc and de Perthuis 2009:12). Since then similar permit markets have been 
applied to carbon trading, in particular, the Kyoto Protocols framework. Delbosc and de Perthuis 
(2009:12) stated that the most developed emissions trading system to date is the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Flachsland, Edenhofer, Jakob and Steckel (2008:5) clarified this by 
identifying that EU ETS is indeed the largest existing cap-and-trade system in the world and initiated 
operations in 2005. Flachsland et al (2005: 5) continued that the EU ETS covers about 2Giga tonnes of 
CO2 emissions at more than 10,000 installations across the 27 EU member states that make up the EU 
ETS.  
A number of emissions trading systems have subsequently started after the EU ETS, including New 
Zealand, Australia, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of ten US-States in north-eastern USA, 
California, the Western Climate Initiative (eight US-State and two Canadian Provinces), and the 
Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (nine US-States and one Canadian Province) 
(Delbosc and de Perthuis 2009:13) . 
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Figure 2.4: Volumes of Carbon Asset Transactions Since 2007  
(Delbosc and de Perthuis 2009:12) 
Figure 2.4 above provides a comprehensive illustration of the immense volume in ETS’s transactions that 
have taken place since 2007. It is clear to see that the largest portion of carbon asset transactions have 
taken place in the EU ETS. 
2.2.4 The Kyoto Protocol in Brief 
“The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by the third conference of parties (COP 3) – held in December 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan – and came into force on 16 February 2005 when the requisite number of countries 
acceded to it”(Scholtz and De Villiers 2011:22). The protocol simply sets fixed limits on the emissions of 
six greenhouse gases. These limits were initially imposed upon industrialized countries only. The 
reduction target level for industrialized countries was set at 5% of each individual country’s 1990 
emissions level (Scholtz and De Villiers 2011:22). Gilbertson and Reyes (2009:8) continued to clarify in 
depth that the Kyoto Protocol included 38 countries that committed to reducing their gas emissions 
levels by 2012 (2008-2012 is the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol). 
At the end of the first commitment period, COP 17 was held in Durban (South Africa) to assess the 
results of the first commitment period and “the way forward” into the second commitment period. The 
result of COP 17 was the release of the Durban Platform document, which creates an ad hoc working 
group whose work will have to be completed by 2015, in order for the legal framework (Kyoto Protocol 
framework) to take effect as of 2020. The aim of this will be to strengthen greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction targets (United Nations, 2012: 2-10). The second commitment period will be a 5 year period 
beginning in 2013. In addition to this result, a Green Climate Fund is also to be launched, which is 
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intended to help developing countries in their mitigation against climate change (United Nations, 2012: 
55-57). 
The Kyoto Protocol supports the use of carbon trading and carbon taxes as appropriate market based 
instruments in the mitigation of GHG emissions. During the first commitment period, the majority of the 
responsibility of climate change mitigation was placed on developed countries. Although this is slowly 
changing, there are “flexibility mechanisms” which help developed countries reach their emissions 
targets and allow developing countries to engage in climate change mitigation. Some of these 
mechanisms are addressed below. 
2.2.5 Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms 
“The Protocol provides three "flexibility mechanisms" that an annex B country (a developed country that 
has ratified the Kyoto protocol) can use emissions trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), (McKibbin and Wilcoxe 2002:124).  
Gilbertson and Reyes (2009:8) and Delbosc and de Perthuis (2009:13) explained emissions trading as a 
market based mechanism of emissions reduction, whereby government provide industries and other 
polluting agents with a license to pollute known as a carbon permit. These industries are assigned a 
specific cap regarding their pollution level (called assigned amount units (AAUs)). If these AAU’s are 
exceeded, it would result in a heavy fine. The permit therefore allows a polluting agent to trade their 
permit with another polluting agent, who may be able to make alternative energy changes more quickly 
or cheaply. Hence there is a certain level or leeway provided to polluting agents. This leeway provides 
essential time for polluting agents in which to adapt to the new carbon limiting policy. The emission 
trading system serves to develop a price on carbon emissions through the supply and demand for 
carbon permits (Delbosc and de Perthuis 2009:13). If an annex B country has excess emissions above its 
cap, it will be forced to trade with another annex B county with who has a deficit in emissions and 
surplus permits. 
McKibbin and Wilcoxe (2002:124) explained a JI as one annex B country granting permission to another 
annex B country, to carry out an emissions reduction project in that annex B’s country for a percentage 
of the second country’s emissions permits. Delbosc and de Perthuis (2009:13) clarified this further by 
explaining that JI’s simply transfer credits from one annex B county to another. This means that JI’s do 
not create credits, every credit that is transferred from one country, is equally reduced in the country 
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that transferred it. Essentially JI projects only take place in industrialized countries, and produce 
Emissions Reduction Units (ERU’s), which are as mentioned above, transferred between two annex B 
countries to reduce the emission allowance in the giving country and increase the allowance in the 
receiving country. Spash (2009:23) mentioned that JI’s are specifically designed for annex B countries to 
have more flexibility in reaching their emission target caps and more importantly, to encourage a more 
sustainable development in industrialized countries. Delbosc and de Perthuis (2009:13) identified that 
the main countries that have taken advantage of JI projects are Russia, Ukraine and Eastern European 
countries, however, Germany and France have recently begun JI projects as well. 
A CDM differs from a JI and ETS in that it is designed to extend participation in the Protocol to non-
annex B countries. Under this mechanism, an annex B country can receive emissions credits for 
undertaking a suitable emissions reducing project in a non-annex B host country (McKibbin and Wilcoxe 
2002:124). These emissions saving projects range from building hydro-electric dams to capturing 
methane from industrial livestock facilities (Gilbertson and Reyes 2009:8). Spash (2009:23) explained 
that CDM’s are designed to produce credits called certified emissions reductions (CER’s), more 
commonly known as carbon credits. Again, this is another form of flexibility for annex B countries to be 
able to engage with non-annex B countries and attempt to increase their emissions allowances by 
producing carbon reducing projects in non-annex B countries. Delbosc and de Perthuis (2009:14) 
explained that the aim of CDM projects is to promote investments in developing countries by 
industrialized nations and to encourage the transfer of low emission technologies. Hence CDM’s can be 
seen as to allow flexibility in helping annex B countries reach emission reduction targets, and a means to 
encourage non annex B countries (particularly African countries) to become more involved in the Kyoto 
Protocol, while simultaneously providing low emission technology to these countries. 
Although the Kyoto Protocol supports a cap and trade system as an ideal market based instrument for 
the mitigation of GHG’s and encouraging cleaner emissions technology, there are a number of debates 
concerning the advantages and disadvantages and effectiveness of a cap and trade system as opposed 
to other market based alternatives. 
2.2.6 Merits and Demerits of a Cap and Trade System 
Chameides and Oppenheimer, (2007: 1670) stated that a cap-and-trade system, which is well monitored 
and enforced, can ensure that environmental goals are achieved by a certain date. Given the sense of 
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urgency in the world’s need to reduce carbon emissions immediately; achieving targets that have been 
set is of great importance. Claussen (2009) made this clear through an explanation that an economy 
wide cap and trade system sets specific limits on greenhouse gas emissions, these limits are set at 
realistically obtainable levels, which make a cap and trade system ideal for reducing CO2 emissions. 
Claussen (2009) also stated that a cap and trade system would encourage environmental integrity and 
cost effectiveness through an economy wide approach.  
However, Pielke (2009) highlighted a possible negative implication of using a cap and trade system. 
Pielke (2009) claimed that a rigid cap on emissions would lead to increases in the costs of energy, 
increasing costs throughout an economy. If these costs are felt by consumers, consumers will in turn 
apply political pressures on elected officials. Consequently this will lead to the practice of a very flexible 
cap which will allow the cap to be evaded in order to reduce the effect on costs, ultimately defeating the 
purpose of the policy. Sachs (2009) is of the same opinion by stating that an ETS can be easily influenced 
to promote additional flexibility. Regulators of an ETS could simply distribute more permits to prevent 
prices from rising. This essentially defeats the purpose of a cap and trade system by allowing more 
emissions instead of less. Closely related to this is Spash’s (2009: 13) interpretation of the modern 
industrial economy as consisting of two sectors: one in which producers are small, lack power and are 
subject to competition, and the other in which producers are large, have considerable power and run by 
professional managers. Spash (2009: 13) stated that professional managers share close relationships 
with politicians and regulators. This is particularly relevant to climate change because the energy and 
transportation sectors are dominated by large national and international corporations able to access 
considerable resources and lobby politicians to their own profits. 
Krupp (2009), however, had a different view on the “private” industrial sectors impact on cap and trade 
systems. Krupp (2009) explained that the creation of a market allows the private sector to become 
heavily involved in improving the efficiency of the market. The profit motive of a capitalist system would 
encourage the private sector, through their investments, technical ability and vast amount of resources, 
to combat climate change. This may be through research into new technologies that promote cleaner 
energy sources or the more efficient use of current energy sources.  Claussen (2009) agreed with this by 
stating that unlike traditional regulation, a cap and trade program constrains emissions but let’s market 
forces set a price on emissions. Rather than mandating a specific technology, the flexibility afforded by 
emissions trading markets helps identify where emission reductions can be achieved most cost 
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effectively. Cap and trade stimulates the development of new technological solutions that can enable 
deeper emissions cuts at lower cost in the future. 
2.3 Synopsis 
This chapter began by discussing climate change; how global warming and anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases have led to, and accelerated, climate change. This discussion then included the physical and 
economic impacts of climate change; the negative welfare and GDP implications that climate change will 
have on different areas of the world.  
The abatement of climate change was then discussed through the alternative means of adaptation and 
the use of market based mechanisms. Adaptation discussed various means of climate change mitigation 
through human behavioural changes. In contrast to this, the market based mechanisms approach 
discussed how government could use a carbon tax or cap and trade system to help mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions. The merits and demerits of each of these market based mechanism approaches were also 
examined.  
To better understand how these markets based approaches of climate change mitigation could be used 
in South Africa, a brief overview of South Africa’s current carbon and economic profiles need to be 
conducted. This would provide an opportunity to gauge the current environmental laws and review 
there applicability to climate change in terms of mitigation appropriateness. 
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Chapter 3 
Background to South Africa’s Position 
in Terms of Carbon Mitigation 
 
Although the Kyoto Protocol, as previously stated, was put into effect in 1997, South Africa has only put 
forward an effective mitigation strategy in 2011. This is primarily due to the fact that South Africa is 
considered to be a developing country and thus has no legal obligations to reduce its carbon emissions 
levels. This delay to include South Africa in the Kyoto Protocol is to provide South Africa time to develop 
and to do so unhindered by emission standards. However, if South Africa’s current levels of GHG 
emissions and its position as the economic power of Africa were considered, there exists a moral 
obligation for South Africa to reduce its GHG emissions levels, regardless of the Kyoto Protocols 
interpretation of obligations. 
This chapter initially focuses on South Africa as a developing country and its current GHG emissions 
levels in a global comparison. It then continues to identify South Africa’s previous environmental policies 
that contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and includes the most recent National Climate 
Change Response White Paper. Lastly, it identifies the two market based approaches to reducing GHG 
emissions that South Africa will be using in the immediate and medium to long term. 
3.1 South Africa’s Socioeconomic Profile in Brief 
Although South Africa could be considered to be the “super power” of Africa in terms of economic 
development, it still has serious problems. South Africa had a GDP growth of 3, 2% (quarter on quarter, 
in December 2012), which has picked up from the recent recession experienced since 2008 (Statistics 
South Africa 2012:1). The South African government uses conservative fiscal policy, which focuses on 
controlling the inflation rate and encouraging a budget surplus. Currently inflation in South Africa is at 
5% (SARB 2012: 1). However, these positive economic indicators do not mask the economic hardships 
that South Africa faces. The population level in South Africa is close to 50 million, with an 
unemployment rate of 24,9%, primarily focussed around the ages 15 – 30; in the unskilled work force 
(Statistics South Africa 2012:1). South Africa also has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world, 
with a GINI coefficient of 63.1 in 2009 (World Bank 2012:1).  
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3.2 South Africa’s Emissions Profile in Brief 
Given the fact that South Africa has the largest and most developed economy in Africa, it is expected 
that it will also have the highest level of carbon emissions as well. South Africa is considered widely as a 
global leader in mining and minerals and has an abundant supply in mineral resources. Gold mining is 
the greatest contributor to South Africa’s GDP, with the coal industry being the second largest 
contributor. South Africa is an energy based economy, “with coal reserves estimated at roughly 30 
billion tonnes, accounting for 95% of African coal reserves and 4% of world reserves. Coal provided an 
estimated 72% share of the country’s total primary energy supply in 2007 and accounts for 
approximately 85% of electricity generation capacity” (DEA 2011: 14). However, being one of the largest 
mining countries in the world and having some of the largest coal deposits, the result is that South Africa 
is also one of the largest carbon emitters in the world. “In 2004, South Africa emitted about 387 million 
metric tons of CO2, just under half of CO2 emissions for all of Africa, and about 1.6 per cent of global 
emissions” (National Treasury, 2010: 16). 
Table 3.1 provides a list of CO2 emissions factors, in terms of which sectors within South Africa consume 
fuel to emit large amounts of CO2. This is expressed as CO2 tonnes per gigajoule. With regards to coal 
mining and coal usage, electricity is shown to be the largest emission factor of CO2 in South Africa. 
However, in both coal mining and coal usage, Sasol (an energy and chemical company in South Africa) 
and discard coal (waste product from the operations of export collieries) follow close behind electricity 
as high CO2emission factors in South Africa. 
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Table 3.1: Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors 
Fuel Sectors to which the emission 
factor is applied 
CO2 
Ton/GJ 
Coal mining Electricity 96.25 
Other uses 94.6 
Sasol 94.6 
Discard Coal 94.6 
Local crude oil extraction 73.33 
COAL Electricity 96.25 
Commerce and Industry 94.6 
Sasol 94.6 
Discard Coal 94.6 
Residential 87.001 
Diesel All users 74.07 
HFO All users 77.37 
LPG Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture 
63.07 
Residential 65.0 
Paraffin Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture 
71.87 
Residential 69.94 
Petrol All users 69.3 
Gas All users 56.1 
(Adapted from: Haw and Hughes, 2007:31) 
 
Table 3.2 illustrates South Africa’s position in the world as a leading carbon emitter and provides insight 
into South Africa’s trajectory to continue doing so. Blodget and Parker, (2010:5) found that an upward 
pressure is placed on carbon emissions, the more a countries population increases. With a population of 
close to 50 million, South Africa is ranked the 20th highest CO2emitting country in the world (Blodget and 
Parker, 2010:5).  
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Table 3.2: Drivers of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Top 20 Emitting Countries, 2005 
Country Population 
(in 1000’2) 
Per Capita GDP 
(2005 int’l 
$PPP/Person) 
Intensity(Tons 
Cequiv/million 
2005 Int’l $PPP) 
Total GHG 
Emissions 
(MMTCE) 
China 1,304,500 4,088 369.4 1,970.3 
United States 296,507 41,813 153.3 1,900.6 
EU-27 490,032 26,592 105.7 1,377.7 
Russian Fed 143,150 11,861 315.1 534.9 
India 1,094,583 2,230 207.2 505.7 
Japan 127,773 30.290 94.7 366.5 
Brazil 186,831 8,474 174.8 276.8 
Germany 82,469 30,445 106.2 266.8 
Canada 32,312 34,972 176.7 199.7 
U.K. 60,226 31,371 92.4 174.6 
Mexico 103,089 11,387 146.4 171.9 
Indonesia 220,558 3,209 229.2 162.2 
Iran 69,087 9,314 240.2 154.6 
Italy 58,607 27,750 94.9 154.4 
France 60,873 30,591 80.7 150.2 
S. Korea 48,294 21,273 145.8 149.8 
Australia 20,400 31,656 231.9 149.7 
Ukraine 47,105 5,583 503.0 132.3 
Spain 43,398 27,180 101.5 119.7 
S. Africa 46,892 8,478 290.3 115.4 
Turkey 72,065 10,370 146.6 107.3 
WORLD 6,461,584 8,708 188.1 10,569.3 
(Adapted from Blodget and Parker, 2010:5) 
3.3 South Africa’s Current Environmental Policies to Help Mitigate Carbon 
Emissions in Brief 
Given all the above, South Africa provides a significant contribution to global carbon emissions and 
hence global warming and ultimately climate change. Hence, South Africa has the very challenging task 
of trying to reduce and mitigate its GHG emissions levels. South Africa has previously developed a series 
of environmental policies through the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), which 
are more targeted towards environmental protection than specifically climate change. However, since 
the Kyoto protocol and the importance of climate change has been made aware, the DEAT has issued 
more policies that are focussed towards climate change, most importantly, the recent National Climate 
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Change Response, White Paper (2011). Shown below is a series of the most significant environmental 
policies issued by government which help reduce GHG and hence mitigate climate change.  
Please note that there have been a number of environmental acts, policies and white papers that have 
been implemented besides those explained below. The intention here is to cover a few considerably 
important acts/white paper policies that bare significance to the establishment of the National Climate 
Change Response, White Paper (2011). 
1) National Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (1965). 
The Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act is responsible for the control of noxious gases, smoke, dust, 
vehicle emissions etc. Noxious or offensive gases are controlled by the granting of registration 
certificates to seventy-two listed processes, which include power generation processes and gas, charcoal 
and coke processes (Department of Health and Welfare 1965: 1-38).  
2) White Paper on an Environmental Management Policy for South Africa (1998). 
“The policy defines the essential nature of sustainable development as the combination of social, 
economic and environmental factors. The policy furthermore sets ownership of sustainable 
development as the accepted approach to resource management and utilisation in South Africa, thus 
entrenching environmental sustainability in policy and practice” (DME 1998: 1-88). The crux of this 
policy is the integration of environmental and economic factors into development policy. Hence, 
resources in South Africa would no longer be managed in isolation through economic considerations, 
but as a combination through the inclusion of environmental factors.  
3) National Ambient Air Quality Standard – Sulphur Dioxide Standards (2000). 
“The purpose of ambient air quality guidelines or standards is to provide a basis for protecting public 
health from the adverse effects of, air pollution and for eliminating, or reducing to a minimum, those air 
contaminants that are known to be, or are likely to be, hazardous to human health and wellbeing” (DME 
2001: 13). This simply means that commerce and industry need to consider the adverse effects that 
production processes and services have on air quality in South Africa. Hence, commerce and industry 
will be held accountable for any externalities produced that tarnishes air quality. 
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4) White Paper on Integrated Pollution and Waste Management (2000). 
“This White Paper on Integrated Pollution and Waste Management for South Africa represents a 
paradigm shift from dealing with waste only after it is generated (i.e. “end of pipe”) towards:  
 pollution prevention 
 waste minimisation 
 cross-media integration 
 institutional integration, both horizontal and vertical, of departments and spheres of government, and  
 involvement of all sectors of society in pollution and waste management” (DME 2000: 10-11). 
 
Since this act there have been a number of similar waste management acts, such as the National 
Environmental Management Waste Act of 2008 (DEAT 2009). Such acts were a breakthrough for South 
Africa’s environmental policy, in that the acts seek to not only help control pollution and waste, but 
actively prevent pollution and waste from the source and only dispose of waste as a last resort. For 
example, since the National Environmental Management Waste Act of 2008 a hierarchy in disposing of 
waste understanding has been developed, i.e. where waste cannot be avoided, it should be recovered, 
reused, recycled and treated.  Waste should only be disposed of as a last resort.  
 
5) The Renewable Energy White Paper (2003) 
Committed the country to 10 000 GWh contribution of renewable energy to final energy demand by 
2013 (DME, 2003). The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) developed a renewable 
energy feed in tariffs (REFIT’s) to help with the power, particularly electricity problems that South Africa 
faced at the time (Winkler, Marquard and Jooste 2010: 7). This initiative was then changed to REBID’s 
(renewable energy bids), run by the national treasury, in place of NERSA and, due to the low attention 
received by the REFIT initiative.  
 
6) National Environmental Management of Air Quality Bill (2004). 
It focuses on the adverse impacts of air pollution on the ambient environment and sets standards to 
control ambient air quality levels. At the same time it sets emission standards to minimise the amount of 
pollution that enters the environment. 
The objectives of the Act are to protect the environment by providing reasonable measures for: 
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 The protection and enhancement of the quality of air in the Republic. 
 The prevention of air pollution and ecological degradation. 
 Securing ecologically sustainable development while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development (DEAT 2005: 1-29). 
An example of the effectiveness of this is act is through the establishment of an Atmospheric Emissions 
License (AEL), which requires that an industry report on all its air pollution sources. An AEL is only 
granted to an industry once it is proven that it can comply with the requirements set out by the ACT 
(DEAT 2005: 1-29). 
 
The above five acts and white papers are the most significant policies that have been implemented by 
government in the past with regards to reducing carbon emissions in South Africa. Of these five, the two 
white papers are of most importance as they provide the DEAT with the knowledge, authority and ability 
to effectively manage and enforce environmental policies. However, none of the above actually focuses 
specifically on climate change or specifically reducing carbon emissions. The, above policies focus on 
setting standards for pollution and ensuring the environment remains clean in general, however they do 
not provide financial incentive or consequences to reduce industrial, commercial or residential carbon 
emissions.  In short, the above policies are not set for a GHG mitigation strategy. 
In 2011, the government released a white paper within the DEAT that does set a strategy for facing 
climate change.  
 
7) National Climate Change Response, White Paper (2011) 
In 2010, the National Treasury published a discussion paper, with the proposal for a market based 
instrument for targeting greenhouse gas emissions, namely a new carbon tax (National Treasury 2010: 
1-75). The discussion paper’s purpose was to gauge the public’s view of the proposal and to get 
comments, before the carbon tax effectively becomes new environmental tax legislation. Within the 
discussion paper, National Treasury provided their objective view as to why government decided to 
select carbon taxation as their preferred market based instrument.  
Initially, national treasury recognized that in terms of setting a tax level or issuing of allowances for an 
ETS; both may lead to a less than optimal outcome and create inefficiencies. In the case of a carbon tax, 
this would be regarding the excess burden it places on low income households. However, regarding an 
ETS, the issue would be a low carbon price that no longer provides incentive to reduce emissions. In the 
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eyes of the National Treasury, the problem experienced by the EU ETS during its first phase when the 
carbon price fell drastically low, is seen as a severe problem in implementing an ETS (National Treasury 
2010: 27). National Treasury also highlighted a number of significant advantages in implementing a 
carbon tax would have over an ETS, namely: 
• Participation and oversight of the tax by the existing revenue administration authority  
• Involves fewer players and therefore incurs lower costs  
• Minimises the opportunity for abuse and risk within the system as it follows a much simpler structure  
• Creates less of an administrative burden associated with creating an entirely new accounting scheme 
for carbon allowances  
• Minimises lobbying efforts.  
(National Treasury 2010: 58). 
 
In addition to this, National Treasury also stated that implementing an ETS would require extremely 
complex conditions to be met; some of these challenges would be as follows: 
• The credibility of emissions caps  
• The allocation of permits freely and/or auctioning of permits  
• A competitive market to facilitate trading  
• Price uncertainty (can fluctuate significantly)  
• New set of financial regulations will be necessary  
• Tax implications (income tax and VAT) of income derived from emissions trading  
• Distributional implications and incidence are neither obvious nor transparent.  
 (National Treasury 2010: 59). 
 
A comments paper on the discussion paper was then released by the National Treasury in the December 
2010. The comments paper highlighted the main issues and concerns that the public found regarding 
National Treasury’s Carbon Tax option, these were: 1) the level of the tax to be set, including an 
adjustment mechanism to help attain this level; 2) The use of tax revenues, particularly in a way to 
protect the poor; 3) Competitive implications for industry; 4) Border tax adjustments and, lastly; 5) The 
consideration of a hybrid carbon tax and ETS approach (National Treasury 2011: 1-9).  
 
These comments rose through public concern and ultimately lead to government reconsidering the 
viability of an ETS approach. Hence in 2011, government released the National Climate Change 
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Response White Paper, which stated that carbon tax will be used in the immediate short term and ETS 
would be considered in the medium to long term as methods of carbon mitigation (DEAT 2011: 24). 
 
 “The National Climate Change Response White Paper has two objectives: 
•To effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts through interventions that build and sustain 
South Africa’s social, economic and environmental resilience and emergency response capacity. 
• To make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the 
atmosphere, at a level that avoids dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system 
within a timeframe that enables economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner”(DEAT 2011: 5). 
 
The policy covers 12 different sections that respond to climate change and how South Africa can face its 
challenges. Amongst these are government’s plans for mitigation in the medium term addressed in 
section 6, of which the key approaches are: 
 “Shifting to lower-carbon electricity generation options; 
 Significant up scaling of energy efficiency applications, especially industrial energy efficiency and 
energy efficiency in public, commercial and residential buildings and in transport; and 
 Promoting transport-related interventions including transport modal shifts (road to rail, private to 
public transport) and switches to alternative vehicles (e.g. electric and hybrid vehicles) and lower-
carbon fuels.  
 
In the short and medium term, several other options are available with a smaller mitigation potential, 
including: 
 Carbon capture and storage in the synthetic fuels industry; 
 Options for mitigating non-energy emissions in agriculture and land-use; and 
 Transitioning the society and economy to more sustainable consumption and production patterns” 
(DEAT 2011: 25). 
 
Most of the mitigation strategies mentioned above will help society adapt towards a more conscious 
way of living (where people are more aware of how their activities contributes to GHG emissions in 
South Africa) and hence attempt to reduce their GHG emissions. However, a very important method of 
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mitigation mentioned, in the white paper is the use of market-based instruments such as carbon taxes 
and emissions trading schemes.  South Africa already has a number of environmental tax levies in place, 
such as aviation taxes, electricity taxes, product taxes, transport fuel taxes, waste and water taxes. 
TABLE 3.3: Current Environmentally-Related Taxes and Charges 
SECTOR LEVY (charge) TAX RATE 
Transport 
Fuels 
General Fuel Levy  150 cent per litre (petrol).  
135 cent per litre (diesel).  
Cent per litre (biodiesel).  
Road Accident Fund Levy  64 cent per litre.  
Equalisation Fund Levy  Currently zero. 
Customs and Excise Levy  4 cents per litre. 
Vehicle 
Taxation 
Ad Valorem Customs and 
Excise Duty (X), CO2 
component (Y)  
(X) Graduated rate based on the vehicle price with an 
upper ceiling of 20% Plus (Y) graduated rate based on CO2 
emissions.  
Vehicle Licensing Fees  Fees vary between different provinces – usually based on 
weight.  
Aviation 
Taxes 
Aviation Fuel Levy  1,5 cents per litre on all fuel sales excluding foreign 
operators 
Airport charges  Charges imposed to fund the operation of the South Africa 
Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA).  
Air Passenger Departure Tax  R150  per passenger - international;  
R80 per passenger to BLNS countries.  
Product 
Taxes 
Plastic shopping bags levy  4 cents per bag  
Incandescent light bulbs 1 to 3 cents per watt (R3 per light bulb) 
Electricity 
Taxes 
NER Electricity Levy  A levy per kWh is implemented on all electricity generated 
to fund the National Electricity Regulator.  
Tax on electricity production 
– non-renewable resources  
2 cents per kWh as from 1 July 2009  
Water  
Supply 
Water Resource  
Management  Charge  
Charge rates vary according to different users. The aim is 
to recover costs associated with water supply and 
abstraction.  
Water resource 
development and use of 
water works charge  
Charge rates vary according to different users. The charges 
aim to recover the costs associated with the construction, 
operation and maintenance of water schemes.  
Water Research Fund Levy  This levy earmarked to fund the operations of the Water 
Research Commission.  
Waste 
Water 
Waste Water Discharge 
Charge System (proposed)  
The WDCS is in the process of being developed. 3 
components are proposed for the system. 2 are cost 
recovery based charge and the third a levy/ tax on waste 
effluent.  
(Adapted from Department of National Treasury, 2009: 22). 
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Table 3.3 displays a number of current environmentally based policies in South Africa which help to 
mitigate carbon emissions and general pollution. These policies help prevent the excess emissions of 
GHG by implementing a tax levy (charge) on GHG emissions, similar to a carbon tax which the DEAT are 
going to introduce, but on a much smaller scale. These are policies which are capable of making a 
difference in combating climate change in South Africa if managed and coordinated and followed up on 
efficiently by government. 
The above environmental related taxes and policies in table 3.3 only cover a limited number of sectors 
and do not provide enough of an incentive for large industries that produce a high amount of CO2 
emissions, to effectively reduce their emissions. Hence, the possible introduction of a carbon tax in 2013 
(that solely focuses on mitigating carbon emissions) by government, will go a long way in further helping 
reduce GHG emissions and hence South Africa, to combat climate change. The possibility of also 
implementing an ETS as a market based instrument to help reduce carbon emissions over the medium 
to long term, would help South Africa tremendously in achieving carbon reduction goals. Being able to 
place a cap on carbon emissions is important in achieving reduction targets and an ETS would do exactly 
that. Hence, the National Climate Change Response White Paper has moved South Africa into a position 
in which South Africa can become actively involved in combating climate change.  
3.4 Synopsis 
South Africa is a developing country that suffers from typical third world economic problems, such as 
high levels of unemployment, HIV and AIDS epidemics and a large unskilled work force. South Africa is 
unique however, in that although it is a third world country, it is amongst the top 20 drivers of GHG 
carbon emissions in the world. This places a moral obligation on SA to make an attempt in reducing its 
carbon emissions. South Africa until recently had very little strategy in place to engage in carbon 
mitigation. It had a number of environmental policies such as the National Atmospheric Pollution 
Prevention Act (1965), the White Paper on an Environmental Management Policy for South Africa 
(1998), the National Ambient Air Quality Standard – Sulphur Dioxide Standards (2000) and a number of 
others which helped in maintaining a clean environment, but not specifically incentivising the reduction 
of GHG emissions. Recently however, government issued The National Climate Change Response White 
Paper which specifically outlines government’s strategy for combating climate change. The White Paper 
states that a carbon tax will be implemented as a short term mitigation strategy and an ETS as a medium 
to long term mitigation strategy. Both strategies are common market based instruments in reducing 
carbon emissions and considered effective amongst most economists and environmentalists. However, 
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there are concerns on how government intends to recycle the revenues produced by a carbon tax and 
similarly those of an ETS.  
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Chapter 4 
Collective Case Studies on Carbon 
Taxation and Emissions Trading 
Systems 
 
Government will be implementing a carbon tax in 2013 as part of its mitigation strategy to reduce 
carbon emission levels in SA. As previously mentioned, a primary concern raised by the public was on 
the issue of the use of tax revenues, specifically how these revenues would be recycled to reduce 
negative implications that arise from implementing a carbon tax. How revenue is recycled is of particular 
importance to protecting the poor and those made worse off by a carbon tax. A good start at deciding 
how carbon tax revenues should be recycled is by looking at the challenges that countries who have 
already implemented a carbon tax have faced and how such countries overcame these challenges. 
Government has also stated that they would be considering implementing an ETS in the medium to long 
term as an additional market based instrument for carbon mitigation. However, in the National 
Treasury’s 2010 discussion paper on considering a carbon tax option, National Treasury highlighted 
“Windfall Profits” and “Over Allocation” amongst other concerns that it had in implementing an ETS. 
Hence, one approach to overcoming these concerns is to look at how the EU ETS dealt with them and 
particularly how SA could avoid these problems in implementing an ETS.   
This chapter will be structured as follows: in considering the negative macroeconomic and 
microeconomic impacts of a carbon tax and how these effects may be reduced; case studies on New 
Zealand, Mexico, Norway and Ireland will be viewed. Each case study will address the following topics:  
 New Zealand and Mexico – concerns of distributional and welfare implications of a carbon tax 
and revenue recycling through a food subsidy and a manufacturing tax subsidy. 
 Ireland – Revenue recycling through tailored welfare packages. 
 Norway – improving the economic efficiency and distribution of a carbon tax  
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In considering the concerns raised by the National Treasury in implementing an ETS, a case study on the 
EU ETS will be viewed. The case study will address the issues faced by the EU ETS through each of its 
phases, including the problems of “over allocation” and “windfall profits”. Furthermore, issues of fraud 
will be identified. 
4.1 The Case of Carbon Taxation in New Zealand 
Creedy and Sleeman (2006) provided an analysis on carbon tax prices and welfare implications in New 
Zealand, in which the effects of imposing a carbon tax on consumer prices were analyzed. The primary 
concerns raised were: 1) The possibility of excess burdens arising due to price changes made by the tax 
and 2) the possibility of adverse impacts on welfare distribution due to the tax increasing the price of 
certain goods that cost a large proportion of low income earning households budget.  Scrimgeoura, 
Oxleyb and Fatai (2005: 1440), in a similar paper, raised concerns of additional carbon tax implications, 
mainly, “the likely impact on economic growth, employment, investment and other macroeconomic 
variables”. The concerns raised by the two papers of a carbon tax in New Zealand can be summarised 
into two broad negative implications, welfare affects and implications on economic performance. Where 
Creedy and Sleeman (2006) raised concern with regards to the social implications that carbon tax could 
have in New Zealand, while Scrimgeoura et al (2005) considered the possible reductions in economic 
performance. 
The New Zealand government decided to attempt to reduce its emissions to 365 million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent prior to its first commitment period of 2008–2012, through the implementation of a carbon 
tax in May 2002. (Scrimgeoura et al 2005: 1443). The revenues generated by the tax were not going to 
be used as a supplement for government coffers, but to rather be recycled in a way to further help 
reduce carbon emissions in New Zealand and alleviate any social implications that may have arisen 
(McKibbin and Pearce 1997:60). Essentially, the decision to implement a carbon tax was based on the 
intention to reduce carbon emissions levels to New Zealand’s 1990 levels as agreed upon by the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
Carbon taxation, as the favoured market based approach by government, was widely opposed and ETS 
proposed as a viable alternative. Beard (2007: 1) stated that “a carbon tax would collect around $500 
million per annum, impact on all New Zealanders, and do little to reduce emissions. Fifty per cent of 
New Zealand greenhouse gas emissions come from agriculture and 20% comes from transport, a carbon 
tax will not have much impact on reducing our increasing greenhouse gas emissions”. Beard (2007: 1) 
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continued that 70% of New Zealand energy is renewable, including hydro power, wind, geothermal and 
biofuels; furthermore, only 7% of greenhouse gas emissions are generated by thermal electricity and 
14% produced by industry and manufacturing. The implication here is that a carbon tax would therefore 
only have a small positive impact on actual greenhouse gas emissions and a large negative impact on the 
business economy. Consequently, carbon taxation was abandoned in 2005, due to the reason that the 
costs of the tax, particularly towards business competitiveness outweighed the limited impact that it 
would have on reducing GHG emissions (Myer 2005: 1). 
In addition to the above mentioned economic costs, Creedy and Sleeman (2006: 344) found that 
households with relatively low total expenditure levels would spend a proportionately greater amount 
of their income on carbon intensive commodities such as petrol and domestic fuel and power. However, 
Creedy and Sleeman (2006: 344) also stated that the carbon tax would not have had any significant 
impacts on inequality or welfare redistribution. Scrimgeoura et al (2005: 1447) made an important 
consideration that “policy instruments such as a carbon tax would adversely affect capital stocks”. The 
reduction in the economy’s capital stock would lead to reductions in GDP ceteris paribus, household 
consumption (an indicator of welfare change), exports and investment. This highlights the existence of 
some important tradeoffs which require consideration by policy makers. 
This New Zealand experience of making a decision on implementing a carbon tax as a primary method of 
reducing GHG levels raises a number of important considerations, such as the welfare implications that a 
carbon tax would have on low-income households. Also, the amount of GHG that could actually be 
reduced by the carbon tax, including the amount of renewable energy the country produces in 
comparison to thermal; and the competitive implications and lastly the effects on the countries capital 
stock. 
4.2 The Case of Recycling Carbon Tax Revenues in Mexico to alleviate 
distributional and welfare concerns 
Höhne, Blum, Fuglestvedt, Skeie, Kurosawa, Hu, Lowe, Gohar, Matthews, de Salles and Ellermann (2011: 
372-387) identified Mexico as the 11th largest GHG emitter in the world. Mexico like SA is a developing 
country and suffers from the same economic and social challenges as most third world countries. 
However, like South Africa, Mexico is considered one of the fastest developing emerging economies, 
primarily due to it being the sixth largest oil exporter (Black 2012b: 1). Despite the fact that Mexico is a 
developing country and, by Kyoto protocol standards, is not required to reduce its GHG emissions, 
47 | P a g e  
 
Mexico recently committed to implement long-term climate change targets into its national legislation. 
Currently, the United Kingdom and Mexico are the only two countries in the world to have done this, 
the United Kingdom implemented a similar Bill in 2008 (Black 2012b: 1). The national legislation bill 
towards which Mexico has committed, states the following climate change targets will help Mexico to 
reduce the levels of its GHG emissions:  
 30% reduction in emission growth measured against a "business as usual" pathway by 2020, and 50% 
by 2050, 
 35% of energy to come from renewable sources by 2024, 
 obligation for government agencies to use renewable energy resources, and 
 the establishment of a national mechanism for reporting on emissions in various sectors (Black 
2012a: 1). 
 
To help achieve these targets, the Bill provides for the establishment of an ETS as Mexico’s primary 
market based approach (Black 2012a: 1). However, research into the opportunity for a carbon tax as an 
alternative has also been carried out. As mentioned earlier Mexico is a developing country that faces 
economic adversities such as poverty, high levels of unemployment and a large unskilled labour force, 
which may make Mexico more susceptible to the negative effects of a carbon tax option. 
Carbon taxation is generally considered to have adverse welfare implications on low income households 
(McKibbin and Pearce 1997:63). It is regressive in that it negatively affects low income households more 
than high income households due to the excess burden it places on these households (low income 
households have to spend a greater proportion of their income on food, when a carbon tax is 
implemented and food prices are generally increased, which places an excess burden on the poor) 
(Scrimgeoura et al 2005: 1430). Consequently, the dilemma would be implementing a carbon tax in such 
a way as to avoid these regressive tendencies. A common method promoted is to recycle the revenues 
generated by the carbon tax back to the low-income households in the forms of a subsidy, grants or 
other general welfare transfers (Scrimgeoura et al 2005: 1431). 
In Gonzalez (2012), an analysis of two specific methods of revenue recycling to alleviate the excess 
burdens placed on low income households by a carbon tax in Mexico was carried out. The first was in 
the form of a food subsidy, and the second, a manufacturing tax cut.  Gonzalez (2012: 1) explained how 
recycling carbon tax revenue in the form of a food subsidy would be both politically and economically 
feasible and tractable for a developing country. Recycling carbon tax revenue through the form of a food 
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subsidy would make a carbon tax less regressive by reducing basic food prices for a poverty stricken 
country. This essentially makes recycling carbon tax revenues through a food subsidy a progressive 
option. 
Gonzalez (2012: 2) explained the other option of recycling carbon tax revenues through the form of a 
manufacturing tax cut as a less progressive alternative. Although developing countries need to focus on 
their manufacturing (secondary) sectors in order to further develop, a manufacturing tax cut would not 
immediately alleviate the regressive effects of a carbon tax. Over time, through increased GDP levels 
and development, food prices may be encouraged to fall, so reducing excess burdens on low-income 
households. However, this is purely speculative and has no immediate guarantee to help alleviate the 
excess burdens.  Ultimately, Gonzalez’s (2012: 12) conclusion is that recycling carbon tax revenue in the 
form of a food subsidy would be the most progressive method; it would have a positive effect on low-
income households and result in a higher greater reduction in carbon emissions, and achieving its 
environmental goal. This implies that although a carbon tax in Mexico may have negative implications 
on low income households, these implications may be avoided and actually improve the standard of 
living for low income households through the implementation of a food subsidy. As such, carbon 
taxation as a method of GHG mitigation in Mexico may be considered as an alternative market based 
instrument. 
4.3 The Case of a Carbon Tax in Ireland 
Callan, Lyons, Scott, Tol and Verde (2008: 407-412) analyzed the negative distributional effects of a 
carbon tax in Ireland and how these effects may be improved, through recycling the revenue generated 
by the carbon tax. They highlighted the fact that generally “green policies” such as Pigouvian taxes were 
regressive and have distributional implications for poorer households; hence they require policy reform 
to offset these negative effects. Callan et al (2008:408) explained that it was important that greenhouse 
gas emission policies rectify these negative effects for political feasibility. They used the example of a 
previous carbon tax policy that was implemented in Ireland in 2004, which was then thrown out by 
government due to its distributional implications on the poor. Therefore, the challenge faced in Ireland 
was at what level to set the carbon tax, and how to prevent negative social and economic implications of 
the tax.    
 
Tol, Callan, Conefrey, Gerald, Lyons, Valeri and Scott (2008:2) explained that the decision of what level 
to set a carbon tax in Ireland were of no importance, the reason simply being that “a carbon tax in 
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Ireland will not stop climate change, it was unlikely to have a measurable direct impact on global 
warming since Ireland’s emissions are a tiny fraction of global emissions. A carbon tax was only 
important to Ireland because it signals Ireland’s commitment to international climate policy”. Tol et al 
(2008: 5) stated that a carbon tax in Ireland “would be able to yield a double dividend for Ireland, by 
both reducing emissions and accelerating growth, if the revenue were properly recycled to reduce 
existing taxes”. Tol et al (2008: 11) Identified three possible scenarios in which revenue may be 
effectively recycled to provide a double dividend: 1) the revenue is used to repay government debt 
(acquire financial assets); 2) the revenue is used to reduce income taxes and 3) the revenue is used to 
make a lump sum tax rebate to all residents. 
 
Tol et al (2008: 13) explained that manufacturers in Ireland are price takers, consequently, if a carbon 
tax were implemented in Ireland alone, the manufacturing sector would still face the same prices as the 
increased production costs would not be able to be shifted to the end consumer. Hence, this would 
reduce the manufacturing sectors profitability and its competitiveness. However, local firms in the Irish 
markets are price setters and so would be able to pass on the tax burden to final consumers, which 
would have negative effects on consumption and reduce market output. However, Tol et al (2008: 14) 
explained that the loss due to the decreased competitiveness in international markets for 
manufacturers (exports) would be partially offset by the reduction in imports (inputs for manufacturers) 
due to the increased price on these inputs (the carbon tax) and the small increased price of the exports. 
Thus, the economic impact of a carbon tax in Ireland (excluding revenue recycling) would not be very 
significant. 
If the Irish government were to decide to recycle carbon tax revenues through investing in financial 
assets, Tol et al (2008: 15) found that gross national product would have risen due to the increased 
revenues created by the investment of the carbon tax revenue. Furthermore, because of the majority of 
the manufacturing sector having foreign ownership, a large percentage of the carbon tax burden would 
fall on foreign capital. In addition to this, a double dividend would occur in which emissions reductions 
are also reduced due to the decrease in manufacturing output and the incentive to use cheaper 
alternative sources of energy. However, the alternative scenario in which the Irish government recycles 
all carbon revenues into debt repayment has a different result, where no double dividend is 
experienced. 
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Tol et al (2008: 15) then provided an alternative scenario for revenue recycling through decreasing 
income taxes which would create distortions within the labour market due to supply implications. They 
explained the logic of this as follows: a decrease in income taxes would increase the supply of labour 
and, through labour negotiations, lead to a decrease in the nominal wage rate to equate labour supply 
to labour demand. This, in turn, would lead to a small decrease in consumer prices as production costs 
are reduced and hence an overall increase in disposable income and consumption. Due to the highly 
elastic nature of Ireland’s labour supply, the majority of the carbon tax incidence would fall on 
employers. This implies that if employers try to reduce nominal wage rates, employees may quit.  As a 
result of this, the manufacturing sector would be encouraged to substitute factor inputs for increased 
labour due to the increased input costs created by the carbon tax. The increase in labour would result in 
an increase in output and therefore a rise in the volume of exports and gross national product (Tol et al, 
2008: 15).  
Tol et al’s(2008: 17) last alternative channel of effectively recycling carbon tax revenue is through a lump 
sum tax refund to households. This method of revenue recycling has no labour market implications due 
to the nature of the refund. A tax refund would lead to an increase in disposable income and 
consumption. However, this increase in consumption would mainly be in imports for mid to high income 
households and food for low income households and, for this reason, will not affect the manufacturing 
sector. There would also be a modest increase in output in market based services due to the increased 
consumption. The net result would be an increase in gross national product.  
Tol et al (2008: 19) provided a summary of how the three channels for revenue recycling differ and 
which would be the most effective for Ireland. With regards to investing revenues or repaying of 
government debt, there is no possibility of a double dividend. If the revenue were to be recycled 
through a lump sum tax refund, there would be no labour market distortions and consequently a lower 
increase in GNP. This lowers the possibility of double dividends and that's why is seen as a less viable 
option. The most successful option would be to recycle revenues through a decrease in income taxes. 
The reason for this is due to the labour market distortions that arise. The positive effects of the labour 
market distortions on the manufacturing sector gives rise to increased output volumes and exports. This 
essentially improves GNP and creates a strong double dividend. Interestingly, Wissema and Dellink 
(2007: 671 - 683), in a paper similar to that of Tol et al (2008), found that the possibility of a double 
dividend to be highly unlikely. Although Wissema and Dellink (2007: 680) strongly agreed that recycling 
carbon tax revenue by reducing income taxes were certainly more effective than providing lump sum tax 
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refunds, the possibility of a double dividend was found to be optimistic. Furthermore, they stated that 
given the Irish governments history in implementing environmental policies, there was insufficient trust 
that the government would keep its promise to recycle the revenue from the tax by lowering other taxes 
Callan et al (2008: 407 - 412), provided similar results to Tol et al (2008: 1-44) and Wissema and Dellink 
(2007: 671 - 683) with regards to how carbon tax revenues should be recycled in Ireland. Callan et al 
(2008:408) used data from the 2007 household survey in Ireland and found that a carbon tax in Ireland 
would indeed be regressive. The following findings were presented by Callan et al (2008:408): 
1) In Ireland, the richer households had on average, 8 times higher disposable income than poorer 
households and emitted only 37 percent more carbon dioxide.  
2) The top decile uses only 26% more electricity than do the bottom deciles. 
3) The big difference between income deciles is in motor fuels: the top deciles use 132% more than 
the bottom one. 
The implications here are split between rural and urban households. Due to the fact that rural 
households tend to be larger and further away from work, they require more electricity to run and 
more fuel to get to work, meaning, they would be more heavily impacted upon by a carbon tax.  
To rectify these carbon tax implications, Callan et al (2008:410), suggested implementing a social 
welfare package through revenue recycling of carbon tax revenues collected. They explained how the 
social package would only benefit those who qualify, such as pensioners, the unemployed, people with 
short-term illness and long-term disability and one parent families. In addition, Callan et al (2008:410) 
also suggested an income tax adjustment that would help the poorer household’s income distribution. 
Their first suggestion considered increasing the tax credit rate in Ireland to prevent the lower income 
households from being included in the low income tax brackets. This would specifically only help the 
bottom income deciles of Ireland and, hence, only those most adversely impacted. Their second 
suggestion regards providing a tax cut within the lower deciles income tax bracket by 0,5%.   This again 
would only help lower income households and those most adversely affected (Callan et al 2008:410). 
The results provided by Callan et al (2008:411-412) simply show that although a carbon tax is 
regressive, a well-structured social welfare package and tax adjustments can offset these negative 
impacts. Such a package in Ireland would only consume 80% of the revenues collected from the carbon 
tax (Callan et al 2008: 412). However, the social welfare package and tax adjustments only offset these 
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negative effects for the lower half of the income distribution in Ireland, consequently more than half 
the population will not benefit from either tax adjustments or social welfare packages.  
4.4 The Case of a Carbon Tax in Norway 
Bruvoll and Larsen (2004: 501) stated that Norway has been one of the most devoted advocates for 
ambitious climate policies. Norway, a pioneer in carbon taxes, implemented the highest carbon tax rate 
at US$51 per tonne CO2 in 1999, when the current global average carbon tax was US$21 per tonne CO2. 
This means that Norway has implemented some of the highest carbon tax rates in the world, in an 
attempt to combat climate change (Bruvoll and Larsen 2004: 501). However, they explained that even 
though Norway has an aggressive carbon tax policy, the carbon taxes have surprisingly not been that 
successful. With emissions of CO2 increased by 19 percent from 1990 to 1999, Bruvoll and Larsen (2004: 
501) identified the most important emission reducing factors in Norway as the efficient use of energy 
and the substitution towards less carbon intensive energy, rather than its aggressive carbon tax policies. 
However, they continued to argue that it was the aggressive carbon tax policy that actually encouraged 
these important emission reducing factors. 
 
A recent example of Norway’s commitment to climate change policy and its Kyoto protocol target is the 
recent increase in Norway’s domestic oil production taxes. Norway has doubled the carbon dioxide tax 
rate for its offshore oil and gas production in 2013, from 210 Norwegian Krone to 410 Krone (or €28 to 
more than €55) per ton of CO2 (Shuetze 2012: 1). Considering that oil is a major energy resource in 
Norway and a large export, doubling taxes on off shore oil may affect these exports. Furthermore, 
Norway has set ambitious targets for it to achieve the Kyoto Protocol targets and to encourage other 
nations to follow suit. In its White Paper on climate change policy released in 2011, it states that:  
 Norway will fulfil and exceed the Kyoto commitment within the first Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period by 10 percentage points. 
 In the period up to 2020, Norway will commit to cutting global emissions of greenhouse gases 
equivalent to 30 per cent of Norway’s emissions in 1990. 
 Norway will be carbon-neutral in 2050 (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 2011: 5). 
Given these ambitious targets, Norway has the difficult challenge of achieving these goals. Increasing 
carbon taxes on carbon dioxide rates may help reach this challenge but may also have social and 
economic implications as well. 
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Godal and Holtsmark (2001: 622-653) looked at carbon taxation in Norway along a sectoral dimension 
rather than an income dimension. They acknowledged that carbon taxes in general have a 
proportionately greater impact on the low-income households due to a larger share of their available 
income spent on energy in comparison to high-income households. However, their main concern was on 
the proposition of changing the current tax regime to make it more economically efficient and more 
evenly distributed. The reasoning for this was that carbon taxation tends to be influenced by various 
organizations that represent specific economic sectors (Godal and Holtsmark 2001: 654). This means 
that various sectors tend to be taxed more heavily than others due to the influence that government has 
over those sectors and the revenue transfers made to government associated with those sectors 
whereas other sectors were completely exempt from Norwegian carbon taxes.  
Godal and Holtsmark (2001: 653) provided an understanding of how carbon taxation could be made 
more efficient in Norway. Generally, sectors that face a higher carbon tax tend to have a greater 
incentive and make more of an effort to abate their emissions, whereas sectors that face a lower carbon 
tax have a lower incentive and therefore, make less of an effort to reduce their emissions. Where 
economic efficiency is improved, a sector has the ability to abate the emissions that have a lower 
marginal abatement cost than the tax imposed on that sector (Godal and Holtsmark 2001: 654). 
Economic efficiency is improved, in this sense, when the total costs of reaching an emissions target are 
reduced.  
Godal and Holtsmark (2001: 654) highlighted several significant factors that the Norwegian government 
took into consideration in developing their current carbon tax scheme, which makes the tax unevenly 
distributed and, hence, less economically efficient: 
1) Internationally competitive process industries seem to be more protected against taxation in 
general because politicians fear that at least parts of the industry would move abroad if taxed; 
2) Rural areas in Norway are home to most processing industries and tend to be exempt from 
carbon taxes to protect the population levels in these areas. It was explained that these areas 
votes have more weight in parliamentary elections and thus a large influence over Norwegian 
politicians; and 
3) The influence particular interest groups are able to exercise on policy formation. 
Considering the above, the government in Norway made heavy exemptions and tax reductions for 
certain sectors in Norway. Godal and Holtsmark (2001: 656) proposed the removal of these exemptions 
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and reductions, suggesting three possible alternative carbon tax schemes, which would be more 
economically efficient and evenly distributed over all sectors. The first simply taxed all sectors on CO2 
emissions only, the second on all Kyoto Protocol gases and the third on all Kyoto Protocol gases 
excluding methane emissions from agriculture and waste, nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture, and 
evaporation emissions from crude oil and solvents. The idea in each scheme was to provide a uniform 
tax over all sectors, so eliminating all government influenced exemptions. How this would be more 
economically efficient was in the extra estimated revenues that would be collected and recycled to 
reduce these costs. Under the current tax scheme, revenue that remained uncollected just for the 
exemptions on coal and coke was estimated at US$ 285 million (Godal and Holtsmark 2001: 656). 
However, even with a more economically efficient carbon tax scheme which was evenly distributed, 
Godal and Holtsmark (2001: 660) and Bruvoll and Larsen (2004: 501) found that implementing these 
new schemes also had some adverse impacts on the economy. They both stated that a broad uniform 
tax would place a heavy burden on the industrial sectors international competitiveness, resulting on 
some industry having to leave Norway, reducing jobs and employment. Godal and Holtsmark (2001: 
661) and Bruvoll and Larsen (2004: 501) provided similar recommendations for countries that may be 
deciding to implement a carbon tax: 
1)  For international industry, co-ordination in an international carbon tax standard should be 
implemented, which would prevent their competitiveness from being affected by a carbon tax 
being implemented domestically in one country and not others; and 
2) If a carbon tax is to be implemented in a country, it should be implemented on a uniform broad 
scale, starting with a low tax that rises gradually, as opposed to a high tax implemented on a 
specific industry only. The reason for this is that in Norway to achieve cost effectiveness, it was 
found that increasing the initial existing tax across the entire sector is easier than including new 
sources which were previously exempt. 
Godal and Holtsmark (2001: 661) share a closing remark with regards to the use of a Pigouvian tax as a 
tool for carbon abatement, “even though green taxes are commonly known to be an efficient 
instrument to achieve environmental goals in a cost-effective manner, evidence from Norway and other 
countries shows how political barriers often function as obstacles in the process of adopting such 
policies. This phenomenon is sometimes explained by the change in distribution of income that green-
tax reforms can give rise to”.  
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4.5 Case Study on an Emissions Trading Scheme 
As mentioned earlier, the EU ETS is the world’s largest and most important emissions trading scheme to 
date, its value of allowances has grown from  $8 billion in 2005, to over $120 billion in 2010 (UN, 2010: 
24). The EU ETS was initiated in 2005, as the most cost effective way for EU states to meet their Kyoto 
protocol obligations, in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Wen-Cen 2011: 114). Essentially, the 
scheme should allow the EU states to reach their obligations at a cost of between €2.9 and €3.7 billion 
annually (METI 2010: 1).  The EU ETS is based on six fundamental principles:  
•It is a ‘cap-and-trade’ system 
• Its initial focus is on CO2 from big industrial emitters 
• Implementation is taking place in phases, with periodic reviews and opportunities for expansion to 
other gases and sectors 
• Allocation plans for emission allowances are decided periodically 
• It includes a strong compliance framework 
• The market is EU-wide but taps emission reduction opportunities in the rest of the world through the 
use of CDM and JI, and provides for links with compatible schemes in third countries. (METI 2010: 1) 
 
The EU ETS has been developed through a “learning by doing” approach, over a period of three phases 
Ellerman and Joskow (2008: 10). The phases correspond to the following years respectively: phase 1; 
2005-2007, phase 2; 2008-2012 and phase 3; 2013-2020. Wen-Cen (2011: 114) explained that each 
phase has three policy instruments, namely: regulatory/voluntary, market-based instrument, and 
penalty/subsidy, to reinforce and integrate its ETS systems. Wen-Cen (2011: 114), described 
regulatory/voluntary policy as “providing important information in constructing the ETS and supporting 
regulations for market based instruments”. Essentially, this is simply the provision of raw data on which 
to build a carbon trading platform. The actual carbon trading within a market, including setting of 
allowances, banking, borrowing and offsetting carbon credits, falls under the market based instrument 
policy (Wen-Cen 2011: 114). The third policy, penalty/subsidy, provides the ideal incentives to commit 
to emissions allowances. If allowances are exceeded, a penalty is enforced and subsidies are used to 
encourage participants not to do so. Therefore, the third policy is the most crucial in helping participants 
to achieve emissions targets. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the EU ETS three phase plan, and specifically the policies mentioned earlier. 
Regarding allowances, the EU ETS made use of a grandfathering approach in phase 1; this is a method 
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for the setting of a total target allowance based on previous emission results. In phase 2, the benchmark 
approach was used, which is a method that involves the setting of a total target allowance by 
establishing a benchmark intensity level for each industry or product, and multiplying that by the 
production allowance for each company. The EU ETS also carried out an auctioning method during all 3 
phases, which allowed the EU ETS to sell emissions allowances from respective businesses mentioned 
above, to the government at a charge. 
4.6 Allocation, Registries and Enforcement of the EU ETS 
Petersen and Klepper (2008: 4) explained that each member state that made up the EU ETS are in 
control of their own distribution of allowances, operation of the registries for tracking allowances and 
emissions, and the monitoring, reporting, and verification procedures that underline enforcement. 
However, Ellerman and Joskow (2008:4) highlighted that each state was also provided with certain 
criteria and coordinated by procedures established by the European Commission. This means that the 
27 independent members comprising the EU ETS have agreed to make the system work by conforming 
to a system of criteria and procedures and trading their allowances. 
With the national allocation process (NAP), each member state proposes and justifies its allowances for 
the trading period (Clò 2008: 6), which implies that each state allocates its allowance amongst its 
installations as it sees fit. “Each member state also maintains its own registry to record the creation, 
transfer, and surrender of allowances; however, a high degree of uniformity is maintained through the 
Registries Regulation” (Ellerman and Joskow 2008:5). With regards to monitoring and reporting, as 
mentioned above, it is the responsibility of each member state to do so. Ellerman and Joskow (2008:6) 
explained that reporting, capturing and monitoring of trade transfers, sales and purchases are done very 
similarly to how a company’s finances are recorded. The transactions are recorded and audited by an 
external party. This would then be passed on to the national registry to ensure enforcement. 
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Table 4.1: The Regulatory and Voluntary Rules, Market Based Instruments Used and the Penalty and 
Subsidy that Each Phase Incurred (as discussed earlier) 
 PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 
REGULATORY OR VOLUNTARY 
Scope 27 EU member 
countries 
Operates in 30 countries 
(the 27 EU Member States 
plus Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway) 
EU Member States and 
participants in 
EU ETS 
Coverage CO2 Covers only CO2, but 
member states can “opt 
in” other gases. For 
example, Netherlands and 
Australia have opted to 
include nitrous oxide (N2O) 
emissions from some 
specific installations 
As Phase II，additional 
gases such as 
N2O, per fluorocarbons 
(PFCs) will be added 
Sources Power stations, 
combustion plants, 
oil refineries, coke ovens, 
Iron and Steel, cement, 
glass, lime, brick, 
ceramics, pulp and 
paper 
As Phase I: 
Power stations, 
combustion plants, oil 
refineries and iron and 
steel works, cement, glass, 
lime, bricks, ceramics, 
pulp, paper 
As Phase II，perhaps 
expanded to 
petrochemicals, ammonia 
and aluminium industries 
Mandatory/ 
Voluntary 
Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory 
Participants Emitters Emitters Emitters 
Target Cap-and-Trade Cap-and-Trade Cap-and-Trade 
Timescale 2005-2007 2008-2012 2013-2020 
Reporting and 
Monitoring 
YES YES YES 
New entrant 
reserve 
YES YES Yes: 
Up to 300 million 
allowances for the new 
entrant reserve; will be 
used to support the 
demonstration of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) 
and innovative renewable 
technologies. 
Unit 1 metric ton CO2-eq 1 metric ton CO2-eq 1 metric ton CO2-eq 
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MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS 
Allowances Free of charge: 95% 
Most commonly used 
grandfathering; rarely 
adopted benchmarking.  
 
Auction: 5% can be 
auctioned; only Denmark 
chose to auction full 5%. 
Free of charge: 90% 
Most of the participants 
used of benchmarking, but 
this using almost entirely 
in the power sectors. 
 
Auction: 
Can auction up to 10%; 
only 11 Member States 
have decided to use 
auction. 
Free of charge in industry:  
Benchmark: 
1. set on the basis of the 
average of the top 10% of 
most GHG efficient 
installations 
2. Sectors which have 
100% of allowances are 
deemed to be the group 
that have high possibility 
to relocate 
outside the EU due to the 
carbon price 
 
Auction: 
At least 50% of allowances 
will be 
auctioned from 2013, but 
the auction of allowances 
in power sectors will be up 
to 100% 
Banking In principle, No. 
(Allowed in some 
countries) 
YES YES 
Borrowing NO NO NO 
Offsets Yes: 
CDM(excluding 
forestry) 
Yes: 
CDM(excluding forestry) 
JI 
Yes: 
CDM and JI may be 
continued, but the 
requirement of reducing 
emissions should be 
accomplished by 
renewable energy or 
resources after 2020,on 
condition of having 
international agreement 
PENALTY AND SUBSIDY 
Financialincentives N/A N/A N/A 
Penalty Yes: €40 Shortfall to be 
made up in the following 
year 
Yes: €100 Shortfall would 
be made up 
The excess emissions 
penalty of allowances 
issued from 2003 onwards 
shall increase in 
accordance with the 
European index of 
consumer prices 
(Adapted from Wen-Cen 2011: 115-116) 
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4.7 Results of the EU ETS Phases 
During the first phase (2005-2007), the EU ETS allocation policy was too relaxed due to the 
grandfathering methods used (Meti 2010:11). The end result for the first phase was a reduction in 
emissions by 8, 3% in 2007compared to 2005 levels. Ellerman and Joskow (2008:6) noted that during the 
first phase, banking was not allowed, so all the excess emissions generated in high energy consumption 
sectors such as energy conversion, iron and steel, cement, and paper/pulp, resulted in the carbon price 
falling sharply.  
However, in the second phase, Meti (2010:12) depicted a different outcome, showing that the EU ETS 
reduced carbon emissions by 11, 6% compared to 2008 levels. The main explanation for the decrease in 
emissions, provided by Ellerman and Joskow (2008:7), is that from 2008, the financial crisis that 
occurred created a substantial decrease in demand, especially for products from high energy 
consumptions sectors. This was primarily because of deteriorating economic conditions, creating a 
liquidity shortage.  
Displayed below, is a table showing high energy consumption sectors and their performances in 
emissions reductions for phase 2. 
Table 4.2: Phase 2 Consumption Sectors Allocations and Corresponding Emissions Results (MT-CO2) 
 Allocation Emissions results  Excess/shortfall 
Power sector 1181.1 1414.7 -233.6 
Total for sectors other than 
power 
645.4 559.2 86.2 
- Cement 204.5 181.3 23.2 
-Oil refining industries 147.5 149.5 -2 
-Iron and steel 179.2 128.4 50.8 
-Paper pulp 36.5 30.7 5.8 
-Other 77.7 69.3 8.4 
(Adapted from METI 2010:12) 
As can be seen above, phase 2 resulted in most industries achieving their targets, excluding the power 
sector and oil refineries.  However, although the results for the second and third phases may appear 
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positive and display effectively operating EU ETS, there are important controversies and issues that have 
risen. 
4.8 Controversies and Fraudulent Issues Regarding the EU ETS 
Two main controversies regarding the EU ETS that are highlighted by Ellerman (2008:28) were the issues 
of: “windfall profits” and “overallocation”.  
Windfall profits is a concern raised by the member states of the EU ETS, that the free allocation of 
allowances to the power sector has resulted in higher electricity prices, which ultimately has lead to the 
power sector making higher profits (this is explained below) (Ellerman and Joskow 2008 and Benz, 
Löschel and Sturm 2008: 6). 
An important reason for the use of free allocation through grandfathering allowances was to protect the 
power sector through its transition in becoming liberalized and to encourage ETS sectors and non ETS 
sectors to take part within the EU ETS market. 
Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis (2008: 12) explained that with the free allocation of allowances, 
there was indeed a problem with windfall profits during phase one of the EU ETS. Ellerman and Joskow 
(2008:24), however, defended the EU ETS through their explanation that EU member states, at the time 
of implementing the EU ETS, during phase 1, were adopting various policies to “liberalize” wholesale and 
retail electricity markets. Essentially, member states were going through the process of making their 
power sectors more competitive in providing power to residential, commercial and industrial sectors, 
while at the same time launching the EU ETS to reduce carbon emissions by 2020 to honour their Kyoto 
Protocols. Deregulation of the power sectors implies that from 2020 generators of electricity would 
have to cover their own marginal costs of production through the market value received for electricity. 
Thus, this market value would have to cover the cost of CO2 emissions allowances in its price, which 
would be passed onto consumers through electricity rates. Therefore, although the price of power did 
indeed rise, it was not due to the fact that electricity providers received free allocation allowances, but 
rather due to the deregulation of the power sectors. 
Over-allocation, as mentioned above, means that the member states who have independence in 
assigning these caps, issued too many allowances, which essentially leads to the emissions cap in the EU 
ETS being non-binding. Essentially, the ETS emissions cap would have exceeded the theoretical ETS cap 
that was imposed on the ETS sectors (Clò 2008: 4). At the same time, an inconsistency arises with the 
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issue of over-allocation. Over-allocation means that the caps set on each sector were to lax, which 
implies that it should have been set at a tighter level. If this had actually been done, the result would 
have been a higher electricity price due to the limit on CO2 emissions in the power sector. 
Regarding this issue, there were a number of studies carried out to determine whether this was the case 
for phase one of the EU ETS, (Gilbert et al 2005; Betz et al 2006 and Schleich et al 2007). An important 
contribution was provided by Ellerman and Buchner (2006), who compared the ETS verified emissions to 
the ‘Business as Usual’ emissions level of 2005 and found that both the ETS cap and the amount of 
emissions produced by the ETS sectors had been lower than the chosen benchmark, concluding that 
permits had not been over-allocated during the first phase. However, there does exist a certain level of 
controversy regarding Ellerman and Buchner’s (2006) findings. Grubb and Ferrario, (2006) contested 
their findings, stating that certain data used could never actually be observed, i.e. certain business 
as usual and benchmark data. Consequently, the amount of emissions that ETS sectors were 
producing before the first ETS phase is unknown and thus makes benchmarking emissions biased. 
The result of this is simply that, it is difficult to disprove or prove over-allocation. 
The over allocation of allowances could lead to the carbon credit price taking a downward spiral as 
credits are over supplied. Convery et al (2008: 12), however, explained that during the first phase of the 
EU ETS, the emissions reductions goals set were very low, 1-2% and that under the first phase, each 
member state had to submit national allocation plans under a very short time frame. Essentially, the 
first phase was more of a trial phase with regards to achieving reductions goals (Ellerman and Joskow 
2008:31). However, the second phase took on a more aggressive reductions goal and achieved better 
results.  
Although, windfall profits and over allocation seem unfair and counterproductive to the abatement of 
carbon emissions, free allocation is a necessity and important part in initiating an ETS. Free allocation 
through grandfathering encourages non-ETS sectors to join and for this reason, cannot be avoided. The 
only alternative is through auctioning initial allowances, which would discourage participants from 
engaging in the market. Free allocation usually results in both over allocation and windfall profits from 
being experienced due to regulators (through the national allocation plan), over-compensating on 
allowances for their ETS sectors. This over-allocation also provided additional encouragement for 
participation in the first phase.  
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Although over-allocation was important to achieving the goals of the EU ETS, it can be resolved by 
ensuring that aggressive goals are set, which in turn limits the amount of allowances which could be 
auctioned in the future. Limiting these allowances would also prevent the carbon price from falling and 
makes the price more stable and keeps carbon credits in demand. Furthermore, auctioning allowances 
as opposed to grandfathering, as done in the first “trial phase”, provided government with important 
revenues, which could then be used to ensure the process is effective and efficient.  
In addition to windfall profits and over-allocation, a range of other fraudulent activities took place within 
the second phase of the EU ETS, which were a result of poor monitoring and regulation of information. 
Table 4.3 provides a detailed description of a few of these incidents.  
Table 4.3: Carbon Market Fraud in the EU ETS 
Date Description of Fraud 
January 2011 Discovery of an EU ETS-wide theft of €45 million worth of EU allowances leads to the 
closure of national carbon registries, the suspension of spot trade, and the 
implementation of an EU-wide upgrade of registry security. 
November 
2010 
Incident of unauthorized access to EU ETS registry accounts in Romania results in the 
theft of 1.6 million EUAs. 
November 
2010 
German Registry closes due to Trojan virus Nimkey. 
March 2010 Hungary sells CERs that had already been surrendered to it under the EU’s emissions 
trading scheme. In response, the EU amends the registry regulations to prevent CER 
recycling. 
September 
2009 
European Commission proposes measures for a consistent response to deal with VAT 
or carousel fraud detected in the market in 2009–10. 
January 2009 The widespread phishing attack on users of EU ETS registries prompts the EU to revise 
Internet security guidelines. 
(Adapted from - World Bank 2011:40). 
The root of all these fraudulent activities lies in the structure of the EU ETS through its independent 
registries. These registries within each member state were being preyed off of by highly skilled “cyber 
hackers” and thieves. The problem with having decentralized registries is the control and monitoring of 
information and transactions, being widespread and easily accessible.  The response by the EU ETS was 
to create a single registry, regulated by the EU ETS Commission that would centralise each member 
state’s registry, and henceforth carry out all registry operations in their stead. This way the EU ETS 
63 | P a g e  
 
“would be protected from insider trading and also have control over the exchange of information, and 
supervision of markets in greenhouse gas emission allowances, electricity, natural gas, and their 
derivatives” (World Bank 2011:40). 
4.9 Synopsis 
The first section of this chapter uses a multiple case study analysis of the regressive economic and social 
implications of a carbon tax in various countries. Case study analyses were conducted on New Zealand, 
Mexico, Ireland and Norway. Regarding these regressive social and economic implications, methods of 
carbon tax revenue recycling as possible remedies were discussed.  The second section covered the 
implementation of the EU ETS. Specifically how the EU ETS was implemented in three phases and the 
results of each phase. Controversies that were experienced in each phase of the EU ETS and their 
possible solutions were then discussed. 
These findings will then be used as a comparison to what other economists have found regarding the 
economic and social externalities that may arise through the implementation of a carbon tax in South 
Africa and the available means of remedying these externalities through revenue recycling. 
Furthermore, in considering long term mitigation, the controversies experienced by the EU ETS and 
these may be avoided will be discussed within a South African context.  
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Chapter 5 
Considerations for South Africa 
Regarding Carbon Abatement Policies 
and Carbon Revenue Recycling 
5.1 Introduction 
South Africa’s immediate to short term policy in reducing carbon emissions is to implement a carbon 
tax, effective as of 2013, its medium to long term policy (under research) is the use of a carbon market 
(DEAT 2011: 41). The IMF (2011: 3) identifies both methods of mitigation as suitable for the pricing of 
carbon.  A carbon tax or ETS in South Africa would reduce carbon emissions through two effects. The 
first would be through a demand effect, reducing energy demand through higher prices. The second a 
substitution effect, substituting from more to less energy intensive fossil fuels (Winkler and Marquard 
2011: 55). Such policies would help South Africa contribute to the global effort in mitigating climate 
change. However, implementing these policies would also cause adverse economic impacts such as 
falling GDP, employment and welfare effects (Pauw 2007: 34). Such negative effects may be worse than 
the very externality being rectified by the tax.  In South Africa’s situation as a developing country, that 
already faces many economic challenges, these negative implications would make South Africa worse off 
and discourage the need to reduce carbon emissions. Hence, the importance of revenue recycling to 
reduce these negative effects and ensure that these policies do not only achieve the target of reduced 
carbon emissions, but also produce positive economic impacts, otherwise known as a double dividend.  
In the case of implementing a carbon market, DEAT (2011: 41) announced in its national Climate Change 
Response White Paper, the DEAT’s intention of investigating the feasibility of an emissions trading 
scheme. This means that an ETS is under consideration but not to be expected for implementation any 
time soon. The DEAT first needs to implement a carbon tax system and ensure its effectiveness before 
an ETS could be implemented. In implementing a carbon tax or an ETS, the possible adverse implications 
on GDP, employment and welfare are generally the same. A carbon tax or ETS will both result in higher 
energy prices, hence inflation, which reduces the welfare of low-income households.  For this reason, 
the rest of this chapter refers to revenue recycling of both carbon taxes and ETS credits interchangeably. 
When a tax level of any denomination or amount is mentioned, it may be considered the equivalent to 
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an allowance charged at the same amount. This is because of carbon being priced the same for both a 
carbon tax and a carbon credit.  
The basis of the data used and explanation thereof, in this chapter will be derived from the works of 
Winkler, Marquard and Jooste (2010), Van Heerden, Gerlagh, Blignaut, Horridge, Hess, Mabuguf and 
Mabugu (2006), Devarajan, Delfin, Sherman and Karen (2009), with the primary use of Pauw (2007), due 
to their extensive work and data collection on LTMS and revenue recycling estimates for South Africa. 
Pauw (2007) used the MARKAL model to forecast the welfare and economic impacts of a carbon tax 
option on coal, crude oil and gas; the carbon tax level ranged from R250 per ton of emissions in 2008 
and increased to R750 by 2050. The alternative methods of revenue recycling considered in the study 
and to be discussed are a bio-fuels subsidy, a food subsidy, household transfers, an income tax subsidy, 
a renewable and nuclear subsidy and a value added tax (VAT) subsidy. The results of these studies are 
compared with the case studies of New Zealand, Norway, Ireland and Mexico, and then discussed below 
to provide considerations for revenue recycling in South Africa. These considerations are for the 
implementation and revenue recycling of both a carbon tax and carbon market in South Africa. 
The remainder of the chapter suggests considerations for additional implications that may arise in 
implementing a carbon market as a market based instrument for mitigating climate change in South 
Africa.  
5.2 Externalities That May Arise in Implementing a Carbon Tax or Carbon 
Market in South Africa 
An externality in this case is negative in its nature. Implementing a carbon tax or ETS could have a 
number of possible negative effects on South Africa’s economy and households. The externalities 
discussed below are the negative implications on GDP and welfare, and the competitive and political 
concerns of implementing a carbon tax. These externalities and methods of reducing or possibly 
preventing their effects are discussed below. 
5.2.1 The negative implications on GDP and Welfare 
When implementing a market-based instrument, two important considerations are raised. The first is 
with regards to the impact on GDP.  A market-based instrument has a negative effect on both fixed and 
working capital. An increase in energy prices is associated with a decline in energy intensive industry 
output. Carbon intensive industries, particularly manufacturing industries, constitute a large part of the 
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economy, attract significant local and foreign investment, and contribute excessively to exports (Winkler 
and Marquard 2007: 12 and Devarajan et al 2009: 19).Each of these effects tends to have a negative 
impact on a county’s GDP. The second consideration regards the welfare implications of implementing 
market-based instruments. A hike in energy prices increases the prices of all goods produced through 
carbon intensive energy processes.  Many low-income households depend upon these goods for 
survival, hence influencing low-income households’ disposable incomes. In chapter 4, Creedy and 
Sleeman (2006) and Scrimgeoura et al (2005) raised similar concerns regarding the implementation of a 
carbon tax in experienced by New Zealand.  
Pauw (2007:38) found similar implications regarding the effects a carbon tax would have on GDP and 
household incomes in South Africa. A carbon tax in South Africa would essentially affect energy prices 
and therefore all energy users. Of significant importance are the effects a carbon tax will have on the 
coal industry. The DEA (2011: 14) stated that the coal industry is the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 
South Africa and, consequently, will experience a large negative shock because of the implementation of 
the carbon tax. Pauw (2007: 35) reports that the coal sectors, particularly the ignite and coal to liquid 
petroleum sectors will experience massive reductions in output, beginning at a 11.7% and 36.9% 
reduction respectively at a R25 per tonne level, to a possible 53.2% and 99,6% if a R750 tax per tonne 
level was implemented. Such reductions in the coal industries impact negatively upon GDP.  
Pauw (2007: 65-67) explained that a carbon tax in South Africa would place a significant excess burden 
upon low-income households. This would be due to the rise in price levels, decreasing real income and 
therefore reducing low-income households’ standard of living. Furthermore, a carbon tax would also 
affect the unskilled employment sector in South Africa, which would exacerbate this excess burden. This 
would be largely due to the negative implications upon carbon dioxide intensive industries. However, 
low income households would not be affected the worst by a carbon tax. High income households are 
actually affected the most initially, due to their reductions in savings required to make the investments 
needed to adapt to the changing economy, particularly low emission energy investments.   
5.2.2 Competitive and Political concerns 
Two important lessons and considerations that Godal and Holtsmark (2001) and Bruvoll and Larsen 
(2004) raised regarding the implementation of a carbon tax in Norway, were the importance of a broad 
based tax, beginning at a low level and gradually rising over time to cover the marginal external cost 
created by carbon emissions and the competitive effects that a carbon tax has on an economy. The 
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Norwegian government learnt the hard way that there are political implications in attempting to 
increase the base of a carbon tax. Sectors that are provided with tax exemptions prefer to maintain their 
exemptions. Hence, the advice provided by Godal and Holtsmark (2001) and Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) is 
to include all sectors in the implementation of a carbon tax to avoid future political conflict. 
Furthermore, a carbon tax increases energy prices and, therefore, the cost of production for the 
manufacturing industry (Garnaut 2008: 3). This has a negative impact on competition for these 
industries, particularly exporters whose competitors do not incur the same carbon tax (Asselt and 
Brewer 2010:45). 
The competitive implications here are directly related to South Africa’s scenario in adopting a carbon 
tax. Increased production costs due to rising energy prices would have a negative impact on competition 
in South Africa, particularly regarding the export sector, particularly in upstream sectors (Neuhoff and 
Mathes 2007: 14). However, National Treasury (2010: 41) addresses this concern for South Africa 
businesses in its published Discussion Paper for Public Comment on Carbon Taxes. Amongst other 
proposed solutions, border taxes, possible exemptions and lower rates for certain sectors were 
suggested by National Treasury.  
A border tax would raise the price of all imports to that equal of the same product produced in South 
Africa, through levying a tariff on imported goods equal to the differential between the local price of 
carbon and the price on carbon in the country where the imports originated (Winkler and Marquard 
2011:20). This would eliminate the competitive advantage of foreign exporters who do not incur a 
carbon tax, essentially protecting South African local manufacturers. Furthermore, a border tax may 
provide possible refunds for exports that incurred a carbon tax; however, this was inappropriate as it 
undermines the intention of taxing all carbon emissions produced.  
Border taxes, although a good solution to international competition, faces controversy in terms of the 
World Trade Organisations guidelines and rules on exercise taxes, “an excise tax on imports can only be 
imposed if there is an equivalent excise tax on like products in the home country” (DEAT 2010: 41). 
Although there are counter arguments to this rule, such as the precedent of allowing trade measures to 
combat global externalities (under the Montreal Protocol), discussed by Frankel (2009) and Bordoff 
(2009), the implication is that a border tax may create tensions in terms of international trade, and for 
this reason, made a non-viable alternative.   
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Making exemptions for industries that are most affected by a carbon tax in terms of international 
competition, would place South Africa in a similar scenario to Norway’s experiences raised by Godal and 
Holtsmark (2001) and Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) in terms of tax exemptions. Not only would the 
industries who produce the most emissions receive exemptions, but a window for the possibility of 
political conflict and distortions in the future would be opened. Industries would protest their inclusion 
into a carbon tax and exempt sectors would be incorporated in the political voting process. Hence, the 
idea of a carbon tax exemption for certain industries was disregarded.  
A possible, yet highly improbable, solution would be an internationally uniform carbon tax, effectively 
placing all countries under the same policy and, consequently, eliminating competitive advantages. 
However, this is an impractical solution as it would be difficult to encourage other countries to adopt a 
carbon tax policy that would deliberately affect the competitiveness their export sector. 
The DEAT (2011: 41) declared the most effective solution for competitive concerns in its National 
Climate Change Response White Paper, essentially, the implementation of a broad based low carbon tax 
that gradually increases to cover the marginal external damages of GHG’s. Such a carbon tax allows 
businesses time to adapt to the carbon tax and promotes the gradual switch to less carbon intensive 
sources of energy to reduce production costs and thus reduce the competitive challenges of the tax. 
5.3 Considerations for Revenue Recycling 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Irish case study provides a number of options for revenue 
recycling. Ireland’s experiences in revenue recycling show that the key to obtaining a double dividend is 
through the distortion effects on the labour market that the recycled revenues create. The first three 
options mentioned are recycling revenues by repaying government debt (or making investments), 
reducing income taxes and making lump sum tax rebates.  With regards to all three methods, it was 
found that in Ireland, reducing income taxes would provide Ireland with a double dividend in 
implementing a carbon tax. This was primarily due to the labour distortions that arose when income 
taxes were reduced. The net results of decreasing income tax, besides reducing carbon emissions were 
increases in employment, output and exports, hence improving GDP.  
Another two alternatives suggested were an income tax decrease and the provision of welfare packages, 
both intended for the bottom deciles of Ireland’s population. Both alternatives were found to be 
effective in improving the welfare effects of a carbon tax. Regarding the income tax decrease, two 
possibilities arose, the first involved increasing the income tax brackets so that the lower deciles did not 
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face income taxes and the second suggestion was a simple tax cut for the lower deciles. The welfare 
packages included pensions, unemployment compensation, short-term illness and long-term disability 
and grants for one-parent families. 
Two methods of revenue recycling, more in tune to a developing country that faces poverty and high 
unemployment, is the option of a food subsidy and a manufacturing tax cut. In Mexico, it was found that 
a food subsidy lowers food prices and thus increases the disposable income of low-income households. 
Consequently, a food subsidy could be progressively distributed among low-income households, which 
would reduce the welfare effects of a carbon tax. A manufacturing tax cut, on the other hand, was found 
primarily to benefit high-income households. This is essentially due to high-income households owning a 
larger share in manufacturing sectors. However, over time a manufacturing tax cut could improve 
production and output, leading to trickle down effects of increased GDP, benefiting low-income 
households through improved employment and development. 
As mentioned above, in the Pauw’s (2007) report on Long Term Mitigation Scenarios, the options of an 
income tax subsidy, VAT subsidy, household transfers, food subsidy and nuclear and renewable subsidy 
were analysed for revenue recycling. Graphical representations of the findings of each option are 
displayed below in terms of welfare implications. In addition, the potential impacts of each option on 
South Africa’s - GDP is illustrated in figure 5.6 and employment and wage changes, displayed in table 
5.1. The options of revenue recycling analysed by Pauw (2007) are analysed in a similar way, to those 
considered in Ireland and Mexico, regarding their impacts upon employment, GDP and welfare.  
5.3.1 Welfare Implications of Revenue Recycling 
Regarding welfare implications, it is important to select a channel through which revenue recycling 
would provide the least harm or most positive benefits to household welfare. Van Heerden et al (2006) 
identified the opportunity to improve household welfare through revenue recycling. Regarding South 
African environmental policy, it is important to ensure that climate change policies do not impact 
negatively on the poor, but rather protect the poor. Each channel of revenue recycling mentioned above 
is analysed in terms of their impacts of the welfare on households below 
 
70 | P a g e  
 
 
(Pauw 2007: 41) 
Figure 5.1 Impact of Revenue Recycling Through an Income Tax Subsidy 
In figure 5.1, the results of the welfare effects of an income tax subsidy are shown. An income tax 
subsidy tends to benefit the upper and middle-income levels of South Africa, with the upper income 
levels actually benefitting positively and experiencing an increase in welfare. (Pauw 2007: 36) explained 
that the upper income levels contribute the bulk of income taxes in South Africa; hence an income tax 
subsidy would benefit them directly. Winkler and Marquard (2007: 87) agree with this by stating that 
high-income households contribute 67% to total taxes, whereas low-income households only contribute 
8.5% to total taxes, thus a tax relief would only benefit high-income households. 
Although the middle-income levels do not contribute the bulk of income taxes in South Africa, they 
stand to gain more from an income tax subsidy than the lower middle and low-income levels 
respectively. DEAT’s (2011: 41) National Climate Change Response White Paper, highlights that 
considerations for protecting poor income households and avoiding distributional impacts will be made 
in implementing a carbon tax. Consequently, an income tax subsidy achieves the opposite effect, 
decreasing the welfare of low income households. An income tax subsidy distributes income towards 
high-income households and is regressive by reducing the income of low-income households. 
Furthermore, the very nature of South Africa’s income tax system would prevent low-income 
households benefiting much from an income tax subsidy. Low-income households that are earning 
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minimum wages are exempted from income taxes. For this reason, low-income households that would 
have suffered most from increased food prices, due to the implementation of a carbon tax, would have 
received limited to no benefits from an income tax subsidy. 
 
(Pauw 2007: 41) 
Figure 5.2 - Revenue Recycling Through a VAT Subsidy 
A VAT subsidy (Figure 5.2) does not increase the welfare of any income levels in South Africa. However, 
it does prevent all income levels from experiencing severe reductions in welfare at the low levels of a 
carbon tax. This is due to the slight increase in prices of goods from rising energy prices due to a carbon 
tax being countered by the decreased VAT levels of the same goods. This effect is made redundant once 
the carbon tax rate passes the threshold of the VAT subsidy. Hence, a VAT subsidy will not protect the 
low-income and middle-income from the welfare implications of a carbon tax effectively. A similar study 
conducted by Devarajan et al (2009: 22) regarding the reduction of indirect taxes (through processes 
identified as tax shifting, i.e. reducing other taxes faced by households and providing dividends, 
essentially returning taxed income), found the same result. Reducing indirect taxes can have a small 
positive effect on welfare and reduce the negative effects of a carbon tax. 
Once the carbon tax level is raised high enough to cross the VAT subsidy threshold, it would begin to 
benefit the upper middle-income households’ more than low, lower middle and high-income 
households’. High-income households would experience a decline in welfare due to the expensive 
switching costs they would incur to reduce the increased price of energy they would face. As the carbon 
tax rises, the running costs of high-income households’ business operations would increase, lowering 
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profits and income and, therefore, high-income households levels of welfare. Upper middle-income 
households, on the other hand, are generally not business owners, but rather highly skilled employees 
and hence, do not face the same burdens of business owners. From Pauw’s (2007) above figure, it can 
be derived that, the upper middle-income households stand to directly benefit from a VAT subsidy and 
would only experience a minor decline in welfare as carbon taxes were raised. In contrast, the Low and 
lower middle-income households would suffer a decline in welfare simply due to the increased energy 
and goods prices. These households would not be able to afford the level of inflation a rising carbon tax 
would cause.  
 
(Pauw 2007: 41) 
Figure 5.3 - Revenue Recycling Through Household - Welfare Transfers 
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(Pauw 2007: 41) 
Figure 5.4 - Revenue Recycling Through a Food Subsidy 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 provide two options for revenue recycling that are the best possible alternatives for 
protecting the poor from a carbon tax in South Africa. These options are a food subsidy, and welfare 
transfers. In figures 5.3 and 5.4, the welfare effects for low-income households are positive as they 
experience an increase in welfare from these two options. A food subsidy would reduce the price of 
food, on which low-income households spend a considerable proportion of their income. Therefore, 
reducing the price of food would raise their real income and, thus, purchasing power and standard of 
living. It would allow low-income households to spend additional income on more luxuries or personal 
development (education, etc), than what they were previously capable. A welfare transfer would have 
the same outcome. A transfer of income to low income households would again provide additional 
revenue for additional spending or personal investment, either way low-income households’ standard of 
living will improve. 
Interestingly, middle-income and high-income households would both experience a decline in welfare 
through both a food subsidy and welfare transfers. The reason for this would be due to the natures of a 
food subsidy and welfare transfers being tailored and intended to improve the welfare of low-income 
households specifically. Middle-income and high-income households would not benefit a great deal 
from a food subsidy, because these households are already capable of purchasing the amount of food 
they need. Furthermore, these households were never directly in jeopardy of not being capable of 
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purchasing their required food if food price levels were to increase due to the implementation of a 
carbon tax. Hence, any benefits experienced by the reduction in food prices from a food subsidy, would 
be outweighed by the additional price increases of “other goods”, such as fuel, manufactured goods and 
imported goods that middle-income and high-income households usually purchase. Regarding a welfare 
transfer, high-income and middle-income households would not be entitled to such transfers and so 
derive no direct benefit from welfare transfers. 
 
(Pauw 2007: 41) 
Figure 5.5 - Revenue Recycling Through a Renewable and Nuclear Subsidy 
Figure 5.5 shows that the welfare implications of recycling carbon tax revenues through a renewable 
and nuclear subsidy would be detrimental for all households in South Africa, regardless of their income 
levels. A renewable and nuclear subsidy is an alternative which would only provide benefits in the long 
run once energy prices are reduced through improved renewable technologies. In the immediate future, 
however, the welfare implications are similar to those of a VAT subsidy without the cushioning that a 
VAT subsidy would provide at the low carbon tax levels. Furthermore, the negative effects of a carbon 
tax would be much more severe for all households, which imply that a renewable and nuclear subsidy 
would offer no protection to the poor whatsoever.  
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5.3.2 Employment and Wage Considerations of Revenue Recycling 
A study conducted by Devarajan et al, (2009: 25) found that a carbon tax on carbon-intensive industries, 
such as coal, crude oil and gas industries mentioned earlier, could have a negative effect on employment 
of up to 16%. An important point is raised by Van Heerden et al (2006:114) regarding unemployment is 
the distribution of unemployment. Unemployment in South Africa can be said to be solely made up of 
unskilled labour in abstract terms (a case of structural unemployment). However there are methods of 
reducing such effects, which is critical to prevent the growth of poverty in South Africa. Van Heerden et 
al (2006) identified the benefits of an employment dividend (the increase in employment, or decrease in 
unemployment), through the use of revenue recycling. These potential benefits and in certain cases 
costs, are discussed below with regards to each method of revenue recycling previously mentioned. 
Table 5.1, provided by Pauw (2007: 40), is used to illustrate and help explain the effects that each 
method of revenue recycling would have on employment and wages in South Africa.  
In Table 5.1, the employment effects and wage changes of an income tax subsidy and welfare transfers 
are similar. Semi and unskilled labour incur a decrease, averaging -1% to -4% at the lower levels of a 
carbon tax. At the higher levels of a carbon tax, employment begins to decline at a much more 
significant rate for both an income tax subsidy and welfare transfer. Furthermore, the wage changes of 
highly skilled and skilled labour are negative throughout all possible levels of a carbon tax, from -1% at a 
R25 carbon tax level to greater than -20% at a R1000 carbon tax level for both an income tax subsidy 
and welfare transfers.   
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Table 5.1 – Employment and Wage Changes of Each Option 
C02 tax  R25 R75 R100 R200 R300 R600 R1000 
Renewable and Nuclear Subsidies       
Employment 
changes 
Semi-
skilled 
-0.4% -1.6% -2.2% -4.1% -5.5% -7.7% -8.5% 
 Unskilled -1.0% -2.8% -3.6% -6.2% -8.2% -12.4% -16.1% 
Wage 
changes 
High-
skilled 
-1.0% -3.2% -4.1% -7.2% -9.6% -14.4% -18.6% 
 Skilled -1.3% -3.7% -4.7% -8.1% -10.7% -16.0% -20.7% 
Subsidise Biofuels        
Employment 
changes 
Semi-
skilled 
0.0% -0.7% -1.2% -3.2% -5.2% -10.1% -14.7% 
 Unskilled 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% -0.1% -0.9% -4.0% -7.8% 
Wage 
changes 
High-
skilled 
-1.2% -3.6% -4.7% -8.8% -12.3% -20.7% -28.7% 
 Skilled -1.0% -3.1% -4.1% -7.8% -11.2% -19.3% -27.2% 
Food Subsidy        
Employment 
changes 
Semi-
skilled 
0.5% 0.6% 0.4% -0.9% -2.5% -7.4% -12.5% 
 Unskilled 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% -0.5% -4.1% -8.7% 
Wage 
changes 
High-
skilled 
0.3% 0.2% -0.1% -1.5% -3.3% -9.1% -15.9% 
 Skilled 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% -0.8% -2.4% -7.9% -14.3% 
General VAT Subsidy        
Employment 
changes 
Semi-
skilled 
0.1% -0.3% -0.6% -2.0% -3.5% -7.5% -11.4% 
 Unskilled 0.1% -0.2% -0.4% -1.2% -2.2% -5.4% -9.2% 
Wage 
changes 
High-
skilled 
0.0% -0.5% -0.8% -2.2% -3.6% -7.9% -12.7% 
 Skilled 0.0% -0.4% -0.6% -1.8% -3.1% -7.3% -12.2% 
Income Tax Relief        
Employment 
changes 
Semi-
skilled 
-1.2% -3.5% -4.5% -8.4% -11.6% -18.8% -25.1% 
 Unskilled -1.0% -2.6% -3.4% -6.2% -8.6% -14.5% -20.3% 
Wage 
changes 
High-
skilled 
-1.3% -3.7% -4.7% -8.4% -11.5% -19.0% -26.1% 
 Skilled -1.4% -3.6% -4.7% -8.3% -11.4% -18.9% -26.1% 
Welfare Transfers        
Employment 
changes 
Semi-
skilled 
-1.1% -3.2% -4.2% -7.8% -10.9% -17.9% -24.0% 
 Unskilled -1.0% -2.6% -3.4% -6.2% -8.6% -14.5% -20.3% 
Wage 
changes 
High-
skilled 
-1.4% -3.9% -5.0% -8.8% -12.1% -19.8% -27.0% 
 Skilled -1.4% -3.7% -4.7% -8.3% -11.5% -19.0% -26.3% 
 (Adapted from Pauw 2007: 40) 
77 | P a g e  
 
 
The use of welfare transfers as an option for revenue recycling in South Africa, would result in a similar 
fashion to the example Ireland provided.  A dilemma in using revenue transfers is its failure to promote 
distortions in the labour market, in that transfers neither encourage nor discourage employment. 
Certain transfers may promote educational development over the long term, however, transfers such as 
pensions, unemployment compensation, short-term illness and long-term disability and one-parent 
family incomes, do not promote job creation or provide employment. In South Africa, the skills 
development levy is a progressive transfer that helps provide skills for the less privileged. Improving the 
skills of the unemployed would provide them with a chance of employment and therefore, improve the 
welfare of low-income households. However, the program does not create jobs, but rather provide an 
opportunity for a person to find one. Alton et al (2012: 18) explained that social transfers improve the 
welfare of low-income households but leads to larger declines in national income. Hence, revenue 
recycling through transfers may encourage significant welfare effects; nevertheless, the employment 
effects are pessimistic. 
Table 5.1 also displays the interesting effects on the employment of a VAT subsidy. Decreasing the rate 
of VAT reduces the prices of goods and services. Through the law of demand, a reduction in price implies 
an increase in quantity demanded, which requires an increase in the quantity supplied to clear the 
market. This theory implies that by reducing the rate of VAT, there should be an increase in 
employment. Table 5.1 shows that at the R25 level of carbon tax, employment due to a VAT subsidy 
does not change by a significant amount (0.1%). The reason for this is simply due to the carbon tax 
eliminating any impact on price that the VAT subsidy provides. In addition, the market elasticity for 
demand may not be sensitive to a small reduction in price that a VAT subsidy may provide. 
An additional important consideration to be made in choosing a VAT subsidy as an option to recycle 
carbon tax revenues is the long-term effects on employment. The European Commission (2007: 12) 
explained that a low VAT rate does not lead to long term increases in employment. Without permanent 
effects on the labour market, the slight increases in growth tend to recede as higher employment 
triggers inflation, pressures on profits and higher interest rates. This implies that if a VAT option were to 
be chosen, any benefits it may provide through revenue recycling would be temporary. Hence, over time 
poor households would experience the effects of a regressive carbon tax. 
A production subsidy, such as a renewable and nuclear subsidy, intends to increase employment 
through the increased demand created by the subsidized price of the good. Consequently, there would 
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be employment benefits provided in implementing production subsidies. However, the DEAT (2011: 79) 
explained that the additional incentive to switch from fossil fuel energy to renewable and nuclear 
energy, causes a decrease in employment in the coal industry. This fall in employment would outweigh 
the growth effects provided by the production subsidy as illustrated in table 5.1. However, the DEAT 
(2011: 79) explained that there is an important consideration to be made in choosing a renewable and 
nuclear subsidy, which is the benefit of reduced energy prices. Without such a subsidy, energy prices will 
continue to increase over time as the carbon tax level rises, which would place additional welfare 
implications on low-income households. 
A food subsidy, similar to the food subsidy considered in Mexico, benefits a developing country 
significantly through providing employment for the unskilled. Agriculture, as the primary sector of 
developing countries, is a large contributor to employment. If food prices were to be subsidized, the 
quantity demanded for food would rise. For this reason, a food subsidy would create jobs for a 
considerable number of the unemployed in South Africa. This is illustrated by the positive effects on 
employment of the unskilled and semi-skilled in table 5.1. Employment in the unskilled sector is 
estimated to rise by an average of 0.6% up to a carbon tax of R200. On a similar level, a bio-fuel subsidy 
creates an analogous impression in employment in the agricultural industry. However, a bio-fuel subsidy 
would discourage growth in the coal industry, and, therefore, result in a fall in employment in the coal 
industry, which is also labour intensive. Thus, a bio-fuel subsidy does not create a positive change in 
employment, as is shown in table 5.1. 
 A further important consideration is the long-term economic effects of a food subsidy. A market-based 
instrument, such as a carbon tax, designed to reduce carbon emissions, is intended to rise over time to 
mitigate the negative marginal damages of GHG emissions. For this reason, as the tax level rises, the 
price of energy and therefore food will also rise and remove the positive impacts of the food subsidy 
through the reduction in the quantity demanded for food. Subsequently, employment in the agricultural 
sector will fall, reducing agricultural output and consequently GDP as well (as shown in table 5.1). This in 
turn would again reduce the welfare of low-income households.  
5.3.3 The Effects of Revenue Recycling on GDP 
Figure 5.6, provided by Pauw (2007:38), shows that none of the revenue recycling options provides any 
positive responses to GDP. A food subsidy seems to the closest positive option. A similar result was 
discovered by Van Heerden et al (2006: 134), where a direct tax break on both capital and labour and an 
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indirect tax break to all households resulted in a poor response for GDP, whereas a reduction in the food 
price (a food subsidy) had a positive impact on GDP. These issues are discussed further through the 
various revenue recycling options previously stated in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
 
(Pauw 2007: 38) 
Figure 5.6 – the Effects on GDP of Carbon Tax Revenue Recycling 
Even at a low carbon tax level, an income tax subsidy would have provided no positive increase in GDP 
(figure 5.6).These results are in stark contrast to those experienced in Ireland. In Ireland, an income tax 
subsidy had a positive effect on employment and GDP through the labour distortions that occurred. In 
South Africa, as explained before, the majority of income tax payers are high-income households. This 
implies there would be a limited distortion in the labour market due to an income tax subsidy. The 
reason for this is that high-income households would spend their increased disposable income on 
imports and to a lesser extent locally produced goods. However, the possibility of experiencing a fall in 
the nominal wage rate is limited due to South Africa’s powerful labour unions and their influence on the 
wage rate, particularly in the primary and secondary sectors Thus, there would be a limited positive 
impact on GDP. An income tax subsidy would only have a positive impact on GDP if the majority of the 
population received an income tax rebate. This would encourage increased consumption in the local 
market and hence increased demand and quantity supplied to clear the market. 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the effect a VAT subsidy would have on GDP in South Africa. At a carbon tax level of 
R600, GDP is expected to decrease significantly by 7.5%. As explained earlier, a VAT subsidy would 
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provide a cushioning for all households up until a certain threshold where the carbon tax level would 
exceed the VAT subsidy’s benefits. However, these effects are very limited and a VAT subsidy has limited 
to no positive effects on GDP as the carbon tax level rises. 
Regarding a renewable and nuclear energy, and a biofuels subsidy, there is a large expected decline in 
output of fossil fuel energy, specifically coal output and, consequently, a negative impact on GDP. The 
reason for this is the incentive to switch from fossil fuel energy to alternative energy, which causes a 
decrease in employment in the coal industry. A fall in employment causes a fall in disposable income 
and consumption, which, in turn, reduces GDP. Bio-fuels are expected to experience the largest fall in 
GDP of the two, at a maximum decrease of 20% with a carbon tax of R1000. This is a rate 5% higher than 
any possible alternative method of revenue recycling. This is because of the poor biofuel technology and 
the large increase in energy prices that would be experienced if a biofuel subsidy were to be 
implemented. 
Where a food subsidy and welfare transfer was very similar with regards to welfare effects for low-
income households, the two options differ very much in the impact on GDP. This largely is due to the 
employment effects of the two mentioned earlier. A food subsidy, similar to the food subsidy considered 
in Mexico, benefits a developing country significantly through providing employment for the unskilled. 
Agriculture, in the primary sector of developing countries, is a large contributor to employment. The 
boost in agricultural output in turn would encourage a positive impact on GDP.  This is illustrated by the 
small positive increase in GDP at carbon tax levels up to R300. However, as mentioned earlier, the long 
term positive effects of a food subsidy are diminished by the rising carbon tax levels. The increased 
carbon tax would continue to increase energy costs and the cost of food production. This would 
decrease the quantity demanded of food and so the supply of food, reducing employment and thus 
GDP. 
Welfare transfers share the same result as an income tax subsidy in terms of their expected impact on 
GDP. Because a welfare transfer has no positive impact on employment and, hence, supply, there is no 
opportunity for a welfare transfer to improve South Africa’s GDP. Therefore at a carbon tax rate of R300, 
GDP is expected to fall a little over 5%. 
Regarding all the above options for revenue recycling in South Africa, the results are generally fragile.  
Devarajan et al (2009: 3) found that a carbon tax that would reduce emissions by 15% in South Africa 
and would also reduce household welfare by an amount of 3%, if implemented on energy intensive 
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industries. The most positive result that is presented is a food subsidy. The same method was promoted 
for a carbon tax in Mexico. A food subsidy provides ample protection for the poor regarding welfare 
effects, through the reduction in food prices. It moreover provides job creation and employment 
opportunity for the low skilled and semi-skilled, as well as support an increase in output and thus GDP, 
which in the least is equivalent to a double dividend. Winkler and Marquard (2011:56), Alton et al, 
(2012:14), Pauw (2007: 21) and Van Heerden et al (2006) all agreed that a food subsidy is a promising 
method of revenue recycling for a market based instrument in South Africa. Van Heerden et al (2006; 
116) continued that a food subsidy may go as far as providing the opportunity of a triple dividend, the 
third being through a reduction in poverty. This places a high preference for a food subsidy as an 
optimum option of revenue recycling.   
However, these authors also agreed that the effects of a food subsidy and benefits it may provide are 
temporary and over time will be made redundant through rising energy prices due to a rising carbon 
price. The DEAT (2011: 84) strongly supports these considerations by stating that at high levels of 
taxation, economic activity (specifically production) and employment will decline. DEAT (2011: 84) goes 
as far as to say that GDP will decline by 2-7% at a R250 tax and 9-12% at a R750 tax per ton of carbon 
dioxide. This leaves an opportunity for alternative means of revenue recycling to be explored. A 
possibility exists in implementing a hybrid approach, potentially combining multiple channels through 
which revenues may be recycled. An example of this would be through the implementation of a food 
subsidy, coupled with welfare transfers. Where a food subsidy would benefit South Africa in such a way 
as to provide a triple dividend, the effects as mentioned are limited. Thus, a combination with welfare 
transfers may help provide a more stable welfare effect and strengthen at least the possibility of a 
double dividend through the improvement of welfare and reduction in carbon emissions. However, 
more research needs to be done on the possibility of using multiple channels to strengthen the chance 
of a double or triple dividend.  
5.4 Considerations in implementing a Carbon Market 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, establishing a carbon market in South Africa is a long way off. 
Considerable research needs to be done before such a market-based instrument may be adopted. 
However, a number of considerations have been brought to surface by the EU ETS experiences in 
implementing a carbon market. Two of these are the initial issuing of allowances and the importance of 
a centralised registry. 
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The initial issuing of allowances: As stated in the previous chapter, the EU ETS issued its allowances 
using two specific methods, grandfathering and auctioning. Grandfathering is often considered a good 
approach for the first initial allocation of allowances. The reasons are that it makes it easier to include 
industry into the market and prevents any transfers of capital from the private sector to the public 
sector, hence avoiding revenue recycling impacts. By giving industry allowances free in the first initial 
allocation, it improves the social political acceptability of the emissions trading scheme. Industry would 
be more willing to engage in a carbon market scheme if given the initial allocation allowances free than 
be forced to purchase their own allowances. However, an important issue that arises through 
grandfathering allowances is the possibility of over allocation. This would lead to certain industries 
receiving more allowances than other industries, causing competitive issues and potential “windfall 
profits”. It also distorts the price signal in the carbon market, due to industries having excessive 
allowances and not being pressured to reduce emissions. 
 The alternative would be to auction these allowances. Auctions are efficient in that they create an 
environment in which the true cost of a good is expressed in the price paid for it, hence, providing 
accurate early price signals in the market. An auction by its very nature would prevent the possibility of 
over allocation, creating allocation efficiency, and eliminating windfall profits from occurring. By 
preventing over allocation, it becomes easier for an ETS to achieve its emissions targets and ensures that 
industries face a certain level of rigidity regarding their personal emission goals. This level of rigidity in 
producing emissions would further help provide an accurate price signal in the market.  
However, an auction would also create a disincentive for industry to participate in the carbon market. 
Although this is an important consideration, especially in the current economic climate where credit is 
restrictive, it is possible to overcome this through inserting compulsory compliance. Again, the 
importance of using a broad based market instrument is raised. If compliance were to be made 
compulsory, it would need to include the majority of carbon intensive industries, to prevent future 
political implications. 
The importance of a centralised registry, identified in the implementation stages of the EU ETS, is that a 
centralised registry provided a more efficient approach to monitoring and enforcing carbon market 
transactions and allowances. A decentralised registry lead to a number of fraudulent activities occurring 
(outlined in chapter 4) and weak control over the exchange of information and supervision over carbon 
markets. With regards to implementing a carbon market in South Africa, this issue may not be as large 
as it was in the EU ETS, simply because government would be limited to monitoring the South African 
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carbon market only and thus be more manageable, as opposed to the monitoring of 27 independent 
member states. However, the fraudulent activities that occurred in the EU ETS were on a large scale and 
involved large quantities of finance, hence the importance of protecting and monitoring carbon market 
transactions efficiently.  
With the establishment of a centralized agency, the South African government would be able to monitor 
and control all transactions and information that passes through the South African carbon market. This 
would limit the opportunity for information to be tampered with and possibly omitted. Furthermore a 
centralized registry also provides a convenient opportunity for the South African Revenue Services to 
process all transfers and other relevant information for the calculations of VAT and similar tax 
implications.    
A centralized registry also has the added benefit of increased security. Having a single registry would 
allow the South African government to pool all its available resources into the monitoring and 
controlling of information passing though the single registry. Multiple registries would require increased 
resources to monitor. Thus a centralized registry would also save on resources and expenses, improving 
efficiency and the effectiveness of the carbon market.  
5.5 Synopsis 
This chapter covers the potential externalities that may arise in implementing a carbon tax or carbon 
market in South Africa. The possible negative implications on GDP and welfare were made aware of, 
followed by the possible political and competitive concerns that may arise. These implications were then 
followed by the potential means of preventing them through the method of revenue recycling. The 
possible methods discussed were as follows: an income tax subsidy, VAT subsidy, renewable and nuclear 
subsidy, a biofuel subsidy, welfare transfers and a food subsidy. Each method was discussed in terms of 
the possible welfare effect implications on household income levels, the implications on employment 
and, lastly, the implications on South Africa’s GDP. The second section of this chapter discussed 
considerations for implementing a carbon market in South Africa. These were the initial issuing of 
allowances and the importance of a centralised registry.  
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Climate change is a global threat that has the capability of impacting upon every country both negatively 
and positively. Although it is observed as a natural occurring phenomenon, it is indeed being 
exasperated daily by human activities that increase global temperatures (Delbosc and De Perthuis, 2009: 
9). There are already known observable physical and economic impacts that have been recorded and 
make this an undisputable fact (Rosenzweig et al, 2007: 83). In order to attempt to mitigate these 
impacts, the abatement of climate change has become of increasing importance. A number of countries 
committed to this abatement through their compliance with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.However, the 
protocol only enforced Annex 1 countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and not developing 
countries. In reducing these emissions, two common market based mechanisms are used, viz. carbon 
taxes and emissions trading schemes. The National White Paper Response to Climate Change (2011) 
encouraged the use of a carbon tax in South Africa as an immediate to short term response. An ETS is 
under consideration as a medium to long term response.  
Both mechanisms are known to have a number of merits and demerits; however, both a carbon tax and 
an ETS have the potential problem of under or over pricing the cost of carbon, making it ineffective in 
encouraging emissions reductions (McKibbin and Wilcoxe, 2002).In addition, both mechanisms can lead 
to a number of externalities arising due to their regressive natures. These externalities coupled with the 
current economic hardships that South Africa faces (an unemployment rate of 24.9% and low GDP 
growth rate) will make it difficult for the South African government to combat climate change while 
protecting the poor simultaneously.  
6.1 Immediate to Short Term Policy Response 
In considering the immediate to short term responses to climate change through the implementation of 
a carbon tax, New Zealand found that a carbon tax would be a regressive policy and have negative social 
implications for low income households and economic implications. These implications were identified 
as a rise in the price levels of carbon intensive products, including products such as food and fuel which 
are basic necessities for survival. 
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In Mexico, the possibility of establishing a carbon tax in a way as to avoid the social welfare implications 
of the carbon tax was explored. Carbon tax revenues could be recycled through a food subsidy and 
provide relief to low income households that otherwise would have carried a heavy excess burden due 
to increased food prices. In Ireland, recycling carbon tax revenues through the decrease in income taxes 
could result in a double dividend. This essentially implied that the carbon tax will not only decrease GHG 
emissions, but also result in a positive increase to the country’s GDP. Decreasing income taxes would 
have distortional effects on Ireland’s labour market and essentially encourage increased output in the 
manufacturing sector and a rise in GDP.  
Carbon tax exemptions are seen to be granted by the government in Norway to secure political votes to 
certain sectors in urban areas. The removal of these exemptions would promote a broad uniform carbon 
tax. Two important considerations in implementing a carbon tax are the implementation of an 
international uniform carbon tax to alleviate potential competitiveness issues that arise when a carbon 
tax is implemented in a single country only and the implementation of a broad uniform carbon tax that 
starts at a low level and rises gradually to avoid difficulties of inclusion of exempted sectors at a later 
stage. 
From these case studies it is possible to determine the potential externalities that may arise in 
implementing a carbon tax or carbon market in South Africa. The possible negative implications on GDP 
and welfare were first made aware of, followed by the possible political and competitive concerns that 
may arise. These implications were then followed by the potential means of preventing them through 
the method of revenue recycling. The possible methods discussed were as follows: an Income tax 
subsidy, VAT subsidy, renewable and nuclear subsidy, a bio fuel subsidy, welfare transfers and a food 
subsidy. Each method was discussed in terms of the possible welfare effect implications on household 
income levels, the implications on employment and lastly the implications on South Africa’s GDP. 
With regards to an income tax subsidy, it was found that only the high-income households would 
directly benefit from an income tax subsidy. Furthermore, an income tax subsidy would decrease 
employment for all sectors of labour at a high carbon tax rate. Lastly an income tax subsidy would also 
result in a decrease in GDP due to the negative implications it would have on employment. 
A VAT subsidy was found to benefit all household income groups at a very low carbon tax rate, up to 
R100. Beyond this threshold, a carbon tax would begin to reduce the welfare of all income groups. 
Furthermore, a VAT subsidy would have provide a small insignificant affect on employment in South 
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Africa of 0.1% at a very low carbon tax level of R25, after which employment would decrease for all 
sectors. Lastly a VAT subsidy would incur a negative effect on South Africa’s GDP. 
The renewable and nuclear subsidy and a bio fuel subsidy were then discussed. Both a renewable and 
nuclear subsidy and a bio fuel subsidy were found to not be viable options. This is due to the negative 
impact that these options would have on the coal industry and hence employment and GDP. Both 
options would also have similar negative effects on low-income households which are required to be 
protected from a carbon tax. 
A food subsidy and welfare transfer had the most positive effects on low-income household’s levels of 
welfare. This was primarily due to the direct tailored affects that are intended for low-income 
households. However, a welfare transfer had no impact on employment or GDP, both employment and 
GDP were expected to decline if a welfare transfer were to be implemented as a method of revenue 
recycling in South Africa. A food subsidy however, had a positive effect on employment and GDP. 
Employment in the unskilled sector was expected to rise at an average of 0.4% until a carbon tax of 
R200. This in turn would provide a positive yet limited impact on South Africa’s GDP for a short period 
until carbon tax levels rise high enough to offset this impact 
A food subsidy was hence decided upon to have the most promising output criteria on which to recycle 
carbon tax revenues. Although a food subsidy is know where near to a perfect option, it may be a good 
option in which to start from and possibly create a hybrid method in which welfare, employment and 
GDP are all impacted upon positively. In addition, there exists the possibility of implementing a method 
of revenue recycling through a dual channel, i.e. a food subsidy coupled with a welfare transfer. Such a 
method would promote a welfare dividend for a longer duration and hence be more effective. 
6.2 Medium to Long Term Policy Response 
In considering the medium to long term approach to mitigating climate change, the EU ETS made use of 
a three phased approach, with three core policies, namely regulatory/voluntary, market-based 
instrument, and penalty/subsidy, to reinforce and integrate its ETS systems. The regulatory/voluntary 
policy ensures the participation of certain large GHG emission industry in each phase. The market based 
instrument policy being essential to the success of the EU ETS in each phase was primarily a cap and 
trade system. Lastly the penalty/subsidy policy is crucial in incentivising the achievements of emissions 
targets. 
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The EU ETS was implemented through a “learning by doing” approach, which allows others to learn from 
the EU ETS mistakes. Some examples of which are the importance of auctioning allowances throughout 
each phase rather than grandfathering. Auctioning of allowances prevents two important controversies 
which have been experienced in various phases of the EU ETS, “over allocation” and “windfall profits” 
(Ellerman and Joskow 2008). Through auctioning of allowances, the market will is more likely to only 
purchase as much as is needed and minimize the chances over allocation. This would in turn “tighten 
industry emissions” and prevent a situation where over allocation creates disincentives to reduce 
emissions. Auctioning would also prevent industry from gaining free allowances and hence prevent 
industry from gaining large unearned profits. 
Another important learning point for consideration is the importance of a centralised registry. The EU 
ETS initially implemented various independent registries in various member states. Unfortunately, this 
resulted in various fraudulent activities occurring in independent member state registries. Furthermore, 
decentralised registries also makes enforcement and monitoring uneven and less strict, the result of 
which creates inefficiency in achieving the goal of emissions reduction. The implementation of a single 
centralised registry allows the EU ETS “to be protected from insider trading and also have control over 
the exchange of information, and supervision of markets in greenhouse gas emission allowances, 
electricity, natural gas, and their derivatives” (World Bank, 2011:40). This essentially strengthens the 
ability of a registry to perform its role in monitoring and enforcing ETS trade and transaction 
Lastly two considerations for implementing a carbon market in South Africa were briefly discussed. 
These were the initial issuing of allowances and the importance of a centralised registry. The initial 
issuing of allowances would be made possible through either a grandfathering approach or an auction. 
Both approaches have positive and negative connotations and would require further carful 
considerations before implementation. A centralized registry was found to be the most effective 
method of controlling and monitoring transactions in the EU ETS. Such a method of controlling and 
monitoring transactions would also be highly efficient and effective in South Africa as well. A centralized 
registry would offer good protection and security of information and transactions, as well as effective 
VAT and tax monitoring 
6.3 Conclusion 
Anthropogenic GHG emissions are widely accepted to accelerate the process of climate change, hence 
the need to reduce these emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, although accepted to not be the ideal method 
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of combating climate change, is definitely a step in the right direction in helping reduce global GHG 
emissions. Given South Africa’s current environmental policies, the implementation of a carbon tax in 
the immediate to short term and a cap and trade system in the long term would help South Africa in 
combating climate change. However, such policies need to be implemented in such a way as to promote 
development rather than discourage it. Targeting GHG emissions through a tax or cap on carbon 
emissions must not be allowed to impact upon the economy negatively, nor disadvantage low income 
households, thus the importance of carbon revenue recycling. Most research into carbon revenue 
recycling in South Africa encourages the use of a food subsidy, which provides a double dividend 
through the reduction in food prices and the labour benefits it provides at lower tax levels. However, 
this is only a temporary solution. Additional measures need to be taken at higher tax levels. The 
possibility of combining a welfare transfer with a food subsidy would need to be considered to provide 
further protection for low income households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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